# MAC---R6

# 1NC

## OFF

### 1NC

#### T: SUBSETS:

#### “Private sector” means all commercial enterprises.

Avis 16, International Development Department Research Fellow @ University of Birmingham. (Dr William Robert Avis, “Private sector engagement in fragile and conflict-affected settings”, *GSDRC Applied Knowledge Services Helpdesk Research Report* , 13.01.2016 <http://unprmeb4p.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Private-sector-engagement-in-fragile-and-conflict-affected-settings.pdf>, Accessed: 7-19-2021)---DFAT = Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the department of the Australian federal government responsible for foreign policy and relations, international aid, consular services and trade and investment.

Whilst PSD is considered to have an important role to play in the field of economic development, there is much debate over what constitutes ‘best practice’ in PSD and what the term private sector encompasses. The private sector1 [BEGIN FOOTNOTE 1] DFAT use the term ‘private sector’ to refer to all commercial enterprises (businesses) and includes individual farmers and street traders, small and medium enterprises, large locally-owned firms and multinational corporations.[END FOOTNOTE 1] can include local formal, informal and illegal actors, diaspora communities and regional and multinational players (Peschka, 2010). This review adopts DFATs definition of private sector engagement which is characterised as a tool to achieve better development outcomes in private sector development and human development.

#### A topical aff could change a universally applied standard, like the CWS [Consumer Welfare Standard]

Phillips 18, commissioner on the Federal Trade Commission. (Noah J. November 1, 2018, Before the Federal Trade Commission, “Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century,” <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1415284/ftc_hearings_session_5_transcript_11-1-18_0.pdf>)

Our second topic today is the consumer welfare standard. And I think most folks even out in the public know, this is the standard that we use across the board, mergers and conduct in courts and at agencies, to judge anticompetitive conduct. It is not only a standard that we in the U.S. apply, it is a standard that is used by competition agencies around the world. It is an economically-grounded standard, and it requires that there be harm to consumers for conduct to be condemned. Mere harm to competitors is considered insufficient. So let me repeat that again. There has to be harm to consumers, not just competitors. The reason that is so, the reason harm to competitors is considered insufficient is because sometimes a less-efficient firm losing sales or market share to a cheaper, more innovative or efficient rival, can be and often is consistent with vibrant competition and with outcomes that benefit consumers. Courts and agencies have embraced this standard for decades. Today, there are two very important discussions going on about the consumer welfare standard, and they are happening simultaneously. And I think it is important that we understand that there are two conversations going on. One is a continuing discussion about how we apply the standard, regarding whether enforcement is at the appropriate level, whether it is properly targeted. This is an introspective question on some level, in which scholars, economists, practitioners, and enforcers all ask ourselves, are we bringing the right kinds of cases? Are we using the right kinds of evidence? Should we be doing more or less in certain places? The antitrust bar, the business community, and others benefit from this ongoing and active analysis. The second discussion happening now, and the one on which today’s consumer welfare standard panels will focus, is whether the standard is itself the right metric we ought to use in antitrust enforcement and in antitrust law; some argue that enforcement under the consumer welfare standard has failed because of the law, and accordingly, that we should reform the law.

#### Violation: The aff targets a narrow subset of the private sector.

#### Vote neg:

#### ONE---limits---economic sectors are infinite---any industry, single companies, individuals, OR any permutation of these. That undermines depth and makes meaningful prep impossible.

#### TWO---ground---only broad reforms guarantee link uniqueness and prevent bidirectional affs that clarify an ambiguous statute in a way that weakens enforcement.

### 1NC

#### HORSE-TRADING DA:

#### Antitrust legislation only passes after it’s horse-traded with Republicans for censorship prohibitions

Perera 3-12-2021, veteran cybersecurity reporter, Data security & privacy reporter for MLex (Dave, “US antitrust legislation faces uphill battle despite unified Democratic government,” <https://mlexmarketinsight.com/news-hub/editors-picks/area-of-expertise/antitrust/us-antitrust-legislation-faces-uphill-battle-despite-unified-democratic-government>)

Renewed interest among US lawmakers in antitrust legislation is unlikely to produce radical policy shifts, notwithstanding the Democratic Party’s unified control of the federal government. Democrats promised a “big, bold agenda” after they captured the Senate by a hairsbreadth in January. Democratic lawmakers may very well stick to those ambitions and announce audacious legislative proposals. But the fate of those bills is at the mercy of a political dynamic ensuring that the more liberal the policy prescriptions, the less likely they are to become law. The most likely outcome over the next two years is more funding for enforcers at the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, whether directly through appropriated funds, steeper merger notification filing fees, or both. It’s also possible Congress could incrementally tinker along the edges of antitrust. It might lower the threshold for challenging mergers, or mandate data portability requirements for social media companies. Those expecting — or fearing — more ambitious outcomes likely won’t see them enacted. So until America’s November 2022 election, scratch from the list of high probabilities reforms such as requiring dominant firms to separate lines of business, or shifting the burden of proof onto an acquiring company. Put another way, unless a bill can attract significant Republican support, not even two years of unified Democratic government can guarantee reforms. — American exceptionalism — Single party control of both congressional chambers and the presidency is relatively rare in American politics. It has occurred in fewer than a third of legislative sessions since 1980. When it strikes, it doesn’t last long — typically just the two years between one congressional election and another. Historically, unified control is a fertile period for new regulations. President George W. Bush overhauled Medicare. President Barack Obama ushered in financial sector reforms and the Affordable Care Act. Indications are that President Joe Biden is emboldened by his party’s last-minute capture of the Senate. History, of course, isn’t a blueprint. Even a brief look at past episodes of unified control reveals that not even single-party capture of the executive and legislative branches of the US government can assure the enactment of a partisan agenda. For one thing, neither political party is a monolith. Although far more politically aligned than when Democratic conservatives found common cause in the 20th century with Republicans, the major American parties nonetheless are coalitions of centrist and activist wings. For Democrats, the tensions inherent in appeasing all sides became apparent earlier this month when centrists trimmed benefits in the $1.9 trillion coronavirus stimulus package. Neither is single party grip on power secure unless it commands an overwhelming majority in the Senate, thanks to a uniquely American institution: the filibuster. In the Senate, the rules mandate a three-fifths vote before debate over a bill is cut off. In recent decades, it’s become a weapon routinely wielded by the minority party to kill legislation. The upshot is that policy legislation needs supermajority support before it can proceed, meaning the 50 Democrats of today’s Senate have little choice but to resign themselves to the grind of finding Republican supporters. There are limited exceptions. Assuming Democrats stay in unison, they don’t need Republican votes to appoint judges, approve executive branch nominations or pass fiscal legislation such as the coronavirus stimulus that just became law. It’s within Democrats’ power to abolish the filibuster, but for now, the maneuver appears safe. Asked just days ago about the matter, White House spokeswoman Jen Psaki told reporters that the president’s preference is for it to stay in place. “The president is an optimist by nature,” Psaki added. — Hunting for bipartisan consensus — Not every bill introduced in Congress, nor even every bill approved by a committee or even an entire single chamber, makes it through the process because its sponsors believe it’ll become law. There are a host of bills drafted with the intent of sending a message to industry, to independent regulators, to donors, to constituents. There are bills that lawmakers view as setting out a position to influence an ongoing policy debate. Even if it won’t become law this year, it might the next year, or the next, reintroduced and refined along the way. Telltale signs of whether a bill is a serious attempt at law are the number of cosponsors, and whether that list of names includes members of both parties in good stead with their party’s leadership. Bipartisan support is important even in the House, where Democrats have the votes to completely bypass Republicans. Because the House doesn’t have the filibuster to contend with, those with the majority of seats control the chamber. House Democrats can and do pass bills in the face of absolute House Republican opposition, but — special exceptions for fiscal bills aside — those bills are dead on arrival in the Senate. As long as the filibuster exists or Democrats lack a Senate supermajority, the House Judiciary antitrust subcommittee must court Republican support if its intention is to make new law. Finding clues of what House Democrats might seriously achieve, then, may be little more difficult than looking up the policy prescriptions House Republicans favor: giving regulators more resources, shifting the burden of proof in merger cases and boosting data portability and interoperability. A report issued by now-ranking Republican Ken Buck as a rejoinder to last year’s Democratic House Judiciary antitrust subcommittee staff report on competition in digital markets allowed that the GOP shares other Democratic concerns, including predatory pricing, monopoly leveraging and control over marketplace platforms. That conciliatory signal also came weighted, with warnings that Congress should be wary of “handing additional regulatory to agencies in an attempt to micromanage.” Instead, try instead telling enforcers they should return to first principles, the Colorado lawmaker advised. Whether Republicans and Democrats in the Senate can find common cause is an even more fraught question. Unlike its House counterpart, the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on antitrust hasn't conducted a 16-month investigation into digital monopolization. The subcommittee’s senior Republican, Utah’s Mike Lee, is prone to touting the importance of the consumer welfare standard and rails against online platforms “eager to impose the ideological censorship called for by their political benefactors.” Lee also says he’s open to working with subcommittee Chairwoman Amy Klobuchar on strengthening enforcement, adding the caveat that current antitrust laws are sufficient. Klobuchar, a Minnesota Democrat, doesn’t need Lee to get a bill through her subcommittee, but failing to find consensus with Republicans imperils her chances of making law. The prospects for her Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act becoming law as current written aren't good. — 'Big tech is out to get conservatives' — A looming question hanging over any bill, even one tailored to win bipartisan support, is whether it could be derailed by Republican anger at online platforms for alleged anti-conservative bias. A right-wing trope especially spread by President Donald Trump during his last year in office — the belief that platforms use their content moderation powers to silence conservatives — has mainstream acceptance in Republican circles. It’s a refrain almost obligatory for Republican lawmakers to repeat when discussing any issue related to online platforms. “Big tech is out to get conservatives,” House Judiciary Committee ranking member Jim Jordan of Ohio has said more than once. Democrats have their own share of anger at online platforms’ content-moderation practices, to be sure. They accuse online platforms of circumventing consumer protections, undermining civil rights laws and not doing enough to stymie disinformation. It’s Republicans, though, who appear the angriest, and are the more likely to insist that any legislative reform touching online platforms address content moderation, with the intention of making it harder, not easier, for online platforms to remove users, potentially imperiling a compromise measure.

#### That allows the GOP to successfully weaponize misinformation---triggers epistemic decay and cements a perma-GOP government

Carpenter 21, contributing writer for The Nation. She received the James Aronson Award for Social Justice Journalism in 2018, and has been a finalist for the Livingston Awards and the National Awards for Education Reporting. Her writing has also appeared in Rolling Stone, Guernica, and various other publications (Zoe, “Misinformation Is Destroying Our Country. Can Anything Rein It In?,” *The Nation*, <https://www.thenation.com/article/society/right-wing-media-misinformation/>)

Natali Fierros Bock says she could feel this mass delusion calcifying in the wake of the election in Pinal County, a rural area between Phoenix and Tucson where she serves as co–executive director of the group Rural Arizona Engagement. “It feels like an existential crisis,” Bock adds. Many of the Sharpiegate claims online referred to Pinal County, and Gosar, whose district includes a portion of the area, was reportedly responsible for helping organize the January 6 “Stop the Steal” rally in Washington that resulted in the deaths of five people. Mark Finchem, a Republican who represents part of Pinal County in the statehouse, was also in Washington on January 6. The Capitol insurrection threw into relief the real-world consequences of America’s increasingly siloed media ecosystem, which is characterized on the right by an expanding web of outlets and platforms willing to entertain an alternative version of reality. Social media companies, confronted with their role in spreading misinformation, scrambled to implement reforms. But right-wing misinformation is not just a technological problem, and it is far from being fixed. Any hope that the events of January 6 might provoke a reckoning within conservative media and the Republican Party has by now evaporated. The GOP remains eager to weaponize misinformation, not only to win elections but also to advance its policy agenda. A prime example is the aggressive effort under way in a number of states to restrict access to the ballot. In Arizona, Republicans have introduced nearly two dozen bills that would make it more difficult to vote, with the big lie about election fraud as a pretext. “When you can sell somebody the idea that their elections were stolen, they’ve been violated, right? So then you need protection,” Bock says, explaining the conservative justification for the suite of new restrictions in her state. Voting rights is her organization’s “number one concern” at the moment. But Bock’s fears about political misinformation are more sweeping. Community organizing is difficult in the best of times. “But when you can’t agree on what is true and not true, when my reality doesn’t match the reality of the person I’m speaking to, it makes it more difficult to find common ground,” she says. “If we can’t agree on a common truth, if we can’t find a starting place, then how does it end?” Around the time of the 2016 election, Kate Starbird, a professor at the University of Washington who studies misinformation during crises, noticed that more and more social media users were incorporating markers of political identity into their online personas—hashtags and memes and other signifiers of their ideological alignment. In the footage from the Capitol she saw the same symbols, outfits, and flags as those she’d been watching spread in far-right communities online. “To see those caricatures come alive in this violent riot or insurrection, whatever you want to call it, was horrifying, but it was all very recognizable for me,” Starbird says. “There was a time in which we were like, ‘Oh, those are bots, those aren’t real people,’ or ‘That’s someone play-acting,’ or ‘We’re putting on our online persona and that doesn’t really reflect who we are in an offline sense.’ January 6 pretty much disabused us of that notion.” It was a particularly rude awakening for social media companies, which had long been reluctant to respond to the misinformation that flourished on their platforms, treating it as an issue of speech that could be divorced from real-world consequences. Facebook, Twitter, and other platforms had made some changes in anticipation of a contested election, announcing plans to label or remove content delegitimizing election results, for instance. Facebook blocked new campaign ads for the week leading up to the election; Twitter labeled hundreds of thousands of misleading tweets with fact-checking notes. Yet wild claims about election fraud spread virally anyway, ping-ponging from individual social media users to right-wing influencers and media. During the 2016 campaign, most public concern about misinformation centered on shadowy foreign actors posing as news sources or US citizens. This turned out to be an oversimplification, though many on the center and left offered it as an explanation for Hillary Clinton’s defeat in 2016; blaming Russian state actors alone ignored factors like sexism, missteps made by the Clinton campaign itself, and the home-grown feedback loop of right-wing media. In 2020, according to research done by Starbird and other contributors to the Election Integrity Project, those most influential in disseminating misinformation were largely verified, “blue check” social media users who were authentic, in the sense that they were who they said they were—Donald Trump, for example, and his adult sons. DONATE NOW TO POWER THE NATION. Readers like you make our independent journalism possible. Another key aspect in the creation of the big lie was what Starbird calls “participatory disinformation.” Trump was tweeting about the election being stolen from him months beforehand, but once voting got under way, “what we see is that he kind of relies on the crowd, the audiences, to create the evidence to fit the frame,” Starbird explains. Individuals posted their personal experiences online, which were shared by more influential accounts and eventually featured in media stories that placed the anecdotes within the broader narrative of a stolen election. Some of the anecdotes that fueled Sharpiegate came from people who used a felt-tip pen to vote in person, then saw online that their vote had been canceled—though the “canceled” vote actually referred to mail-in ballots that voters had requested before deciding to vote in person. “It’s a really powerful kind of propaganda, because the people that were helping to create these narratives really did think they were experiencing fraud,” Starbird says. Action by content moderators usually came too late and was complicated by the fact that many claims of disenfranchisement by individual users were difficult to verify or disprove. The Capitol riot led the tech giants to take more aggressive action against Trump and other peddlers of misinformation. Twitter and Facebook kicked Trump off their platforms and shut down tens of thousands of accounts and pages. Facebook clamped down on some of its groups, which the company’s own data scientists had previously warned were incubating misinformation and “enthusiastic calls for violence,” according to an internal presentation. Google and Apple booted Parler, a social media site used primarily by the far right, from their app stores, and Amazon stopped hosting Parler’s data on its cloud infrastructure system, forcing it temporarily offline. But these measures were largely reactions to harm already done. “Moderation doesn’t reduce the demand for [misleading] content, and demand for that content has grown during some periods of time when the platforms weren’t moderating or weren’t addressing some of the more egregious ways their tools were abused,” says Renée DiResta, technical research manager at the Stanford Internet Observatory. Deplatforming individuals or denying service to companies that tolerate violent rhetoric, as Amazon did with Parler, can have an impact, particularly in the short term and when done at scale. It reduces the reach of influential liars and can make it more difficult for “alt-tech” apps to operate. A notorious example of deplatforming involved Alex Jones, the conspiracy theorist behind the site Infowars. Jones was kicked off Apple, Facebook, YouTube, and Spotify in 2018 for his repeated endorsement of violence. He lost nearly 2.5 million subscribers on YouTube alone, and in the three weeks after his accounts were cut off, Infowars’ daily average visits dropped from close to 1.4 million to 715,000. But Jones didn’t disappear—he migrated to Parler, Gab, and other alt-tech platforms, and he spoke at a rally in Washington the night before the Capitol attack. One outcome of unplugging Trump and other right-wing influencers has been a surge of interest in those alternative social media platforms, where more dangerous echo chambers can form and, in encrypted spaces, be more difficult to monitor. “Isn’t this just going to make the extreme communities worse? Yes,” says Ethan Zuckerman, founder of the Institute for Digital Public Infrastructure at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. “But we’re already headed there, and at least the good news is that [extremists] aren’t going to be recruiting in these mainstream spaces.” The bad news, in Zuckerman’s view, is that the far right is now leading the effort to create new forms of online community. “The Nazis right now have an incentive to build alternative distributed media, and the rest of us are behind, because we don’t have the incentive to do it,” Zuckerman explains. He argues that a digital infrastructure that is smaller, distributed, and not-for-profit is the path to a better Internet. “And my real deep fear is that we end up ceding the design of this way of building social networks to far-right extremists, because they are the ones who need these new spaces to discuss and organize.” In March, Trump spokesman Jason Miller said on Fox that the former president was likely to return to social media this spring “with his own platform.” A more fundamental problem than Trump’s presence or absence on Twitter is the power that a single executive—Jack Dorsey, in the case of Twitter—has in making that decision. Social media companies have become so big that they have little fear of accountability in the form of competition. “To put it simply, companies that once were scrappy, underdog startups that challenged the status quo have become the kinds of monopolies we last saw in the era of oil barons and railroad tycoons,” concluded a recent report by the staff of the Democratic members of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust. For now, the reforms at Facebook and other companies remain largely superficial. The platforms are still based on algorithms that reward outrageous content and are still financed via the collection and sale of user data. Karen Hao of MIT Technology Review recently reported that a former Facebook AI researcher told her “his team conducted ‘study after study’ confirming the same basic idea: models that maximize engagement increase polarization.” Hao’s investigation concluded that Facebook leadership’s relentless pursuit of growth “repeatedly weakened or halted many initiatives meant to clean up misinformation on the platform.” The modest “break glass” measures Facebook took during the election in response to the swell of misinformation, which included tweaks to its ranking algorithm to emphasize news sources it considered “authoritative,” have already been reversed. Tech companies could do more, as the election-time tweaks revealed. But they still “refuse to see misinformation as a core feature of their product,” says Joan Donovan, research director for the Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University. The problem of misinformation appears so vast “because that’s exactly what the technology allows.” There are some signs of a growing appetite for regulation on Capitol Hill. Democrats have proposed reforms to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which insulates tech companies from legal liability for content posted to their platforms, such as requiring more transparency about content moderation and opening platforms to lawsuits in limited circumstances when content causes real-world harm. (GOP critiques of Section 230, on the other hand, make the false argument that it allows platforms to discriminate against conservatives.) Another legislative tactic would focus on the algorithms that platforms use to amplify content, rather than on the content itself. A bill introduced by two House Democrats would make companies liable if their algorithms promote content linked to acts of violence. Democratic lawmakers are also eyeing changes to antitrust law, while several antitrust lawsuits have been filed against Facebook and Google. But litigation could take years. Even breaking up Big Tech would leave intact its predatory business model. To address this, Zuckerman and other experts have called for a tax on targeted digital advertising. Such a tax would discourage targeted advertising, and the revenue could be used to fund public-service media. Held to account? Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey testified remotely before the Senate Judiciary Committee in November 2020. (Matt York / AP) Social media plays a key role in amplifying conspiracy theories and political misinformation, but it didn’t create them. “When we think of disinformation as something that appeared [only in the Trump era], and that we used to have this agreed-upon narrative of what was true and then social platforms came into the picture and now that’s all fragmented… that makes a lot of assumptions about the idea that everyone used to agree on what was true and what was false,” says Alice E. Marwick, an assistant professor at the University of North Carolina who studies social media and society. Politicians have long leveraged misinformation, particularly racist tropes. But it’s been made particularly potent not just by social media, Marwick argues, but by the right-wing media industry that profits from lies. “The American online public sphere is a shambles because it was grafted onto a television and radio public sphere that was already deeply broken,” argue Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, and Hal Roberts of Harvard’s Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society in their book Network Propaganda. The collapse of local news left a vacuum that for many Americans has been filled by partisan outlets that, on the right, are characterized by blatant disregard for journalistic standards of sourcing and verification. This insulated world of right-wing outlets, which stretches from those that bill themselves as objective sources, Fox News chief among them, to talk radio and extreme sites like Infowars and The Gateway Pundit, “represents a radicalization of roughly a third of the American media system,” the authors write. The conservative movement spent decades building this apparatus to peddle lies and fear along with miracle cures and pyramid schemes, and was so successful that Fox and other far-right outlets ended up in a tight two-step with the White House. Fox chairman Rupert Murdoch maintained a close relationship with Trump, as did Sean Hannity and former Fox News copresident Bill Shine, who became White House communications director in 2018. The backlash against Fox in the wake of the election hinted at a possible dethroning of the ruler of the right’s media machine. Its farther-right rival Newsmax TV posted a higher rating than Fox for the first time ever in the month after the election, following supportive tweets from Trump, and during the week of November 9 it passed Breitbart as the most-visited conservative website. But Fox quickly regained its perch. The network backpedaled rapidly during its post-election ratings slump, firing an editor who’d defended the projection of a Biden win in Arizona and replacing news programming with opinion content. According to Media Matters, Fox News pushed the idea of a stolen election nearly 800 times in the two weeks after declaring Biden the winner. The network’s ad revenue increased 31 percent during the final quarter of 2020, while its parent company, Fox Corporation, saw a 17 percent jump in pretax profit. The far-right media ecosystem has become so powerful in part because there’s been no downside to lying. Instead, the Trump administration demonstrated that there was a market opportunity in serving up misinformation that purports to back up what people want to believe. “In this day and age, people want something that tends to affirm their views and opinions,” Newsmax CEO Chris Ruddy told The New York Times’ Ben Smith in an interview published shortly after the election. Claims of a rigged election were “great for news,” he said in another interview. Trump’s departure from the White House won’t necessarily reduce the demand for this kind of content. Since the Capitol riot, two voting-systems companies have launched an unusual effort to hold right-wing outlets and influencers accountable for some of the lies they’ve spread. Dominion Voting Systems, a major provider of voting technology, and another company called Smartmatic were the subjects of myriad outlandish claims related to election fraud, many of which were used in lawsuits filed by Trump’s campaign and were repeatedly broadcast on Fox, Newsmax TV, and OAN. Since January the companies have filed several defamation suits against Trump campaign lawyers Sidney Powell and Rudy Giuliani, MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell, and Fox News and three of its hosts. Dominion alleges that as a result of false accusations, its “founder and employees have been harassed and have received death threats, and Dominion has suffered unprecedented and irreparable harm.” The threat of legal action forced a number of media companies to issue corrections for stories about supposed election meddling that mentioned Dominion. The conservative website American Thinker published a statement admitting its stories about Dominion were “completely false and have no basis in fact” and “rel[ied] on discredited sources who have peddled debunked theories.” OAN simply deleted all of the stories about Dominion from its website without comment. These lawsuits will not dismantle the world of right-wing media, but they have prompted a more robust debate about how media and social media companies could be held liable for lies that turn lethal—and whether this type of legal action should be pursued, given the protections afforded by the First Amendment and the fact that the powerful often use libel law to bully journalists. Alternative reality: Trump supporters in Maricopa County derided Fox for reporting on election night that Biden had won the state. (Hannah McKay / Pool / Getty Images) Ethan Zuckerman has been thinking about how to build a better Internet for years, a preoccupation not unrelated to the fact that, in the 1990s, he wrote the code that created pop-up ads. (“I’m sorry. Our intentions were good,” he wrote in 2014.) Still, he believes that framing misinformation as a problem of media and technology is myopic. “It’s very hard to conclude that this is purely an informational problem,” Zuckerman says. “It’s a power problem.” The GOP is increasingly tolerant of, and even reliant on, weaponized misinformation. “We’re in a place where the Republican Party realizes that as much as 70 percent of their voters don’t believe that Biden was legitimately elected, and they are now deeply reluctant to contradict what their voters believe,” Zuckerman says. Republicans are reluctant, at least in part, because of a legitimate fear of primary challenges from the right, but also because they learned from Trump the power of using conspiracy theories to mobilize alienated voters by preying on their deep mistrust of public institutions. It’s one thing for an ordinary citizen to retweet a false claim; it’s another for elected officials to legitimize conspiracy theories. But holding the GOP to account may prove to be even harder than reforming Big Tech. The radical grass roots have been empowered by small-dollar fundraising and gerrymandering, while more moderate Republicans are retiring or leaving the party. Writer Erick Trickey argued recently in The Washington Post that what undercut a similar wave of conservative crackpot paranoia driven by the John Birch Society in the 1960s was explicit denunciation by prominent conservatives like William Buckley and Ronald Reagan as well as Republican congressional leaders. But today’s party leaders have been unwilling to excommunicate conspiracy-mongers. In the aftermath of the Capitol riot, elected officials who spread rumors that the violence was actually the result of antifascists—including Arizona’s Paul Gosar and Andy Biggs—gained notoriety, while those critical of Trump were publicly humiliated. The embrace of conspiratorial narratives has been particularly pronounced in state GOP organizations. The Texas GOP recently incorporated the QAnon slogan “We are the storm” into official publicity media, and the Oregon GOP’s executive committee endorsed the theory that the riot had been a “false flag” operation. In March, members of the Oregon GOP voted to replace its Trump-supporting chairman with a candidate even farther out on the extremist fringe. 0;pi; aWeaponized misinformation could have a lasting impact not only on the shape of the GOP but also on public policy. Republicans are now using the big lie to try to restrict voting rights in Arizona, Georgia, and dozens of other states. As of February 19, according to the Brennan Center for Justice, lawmakers in 43 states had introduced more than 250 bills restricting access to voting, “over seven times the number of restrictive bills as compared to roughly this time last year.” In late March, Georgia Governor Brian Kemp signed a 95-page bill making it harder to vote in that state in a number of ways. Many of the far-right extremists, politicians, and media influencers who spread misinformation about the presidential election are now pushing falsehoods about Covid-19 vaccines. The rumors, which have spread on social media apps like Telegram that are frequented by QAnon adherents and militia groups, among others, range from standard anti-vax talking points to absurd claims that the vaccines are part of a secret plan hatched by Bill Gates to implant trackable microchips, or that they cause infertility or alter human DNA. Sidestepping the craziest conspiracies, prominent conservatives like Tucker Carlson and Wisconsin Senator Ron Johnson, who has become one of the GOP’s leading purveyors of misinformation, are casting doubt about vaccine safety under the pretense of “just asking questions.” Vaccine misinformation plays into the longstanding conservative effort to sow mistrust in government, and it appears to be having an effect: A third of Republicans now say they don’t want to get vaccinated. These are the true costs of misinformation: deadly riots, policy changes that could disenfranchise legitimate voters, scores of preventable deaths. These translate into financial externalities: the additional expense of securing the Capitol, additional dollars devoted to the pandemic response. More abstract but no less real are the social costs: the parents lost down QAnon rabbit holes, the erosion of factual foundations that permit productive argument. The problem with the far right’s universe of “alternative facts” is not that it’s hermetically sealed from the universe the rest of us live in. Rather, it’s that these universes cannot truly be separated. If we’ve learned anything in the past six months, it’s that epistemological distance doesn’t prevent collisions in the real world that can be lethal to individuals—and potentially ruinous for democratic systems.

#### Unchecked disinformation is an existential risk

Enderle 18, president and principal analyst of the Enderle Group, a forward looking emerging technology advisory firm (Rob, “Fake News Has Become an Existential Threat,” Tech News World, <https://www.technewsworld.com/story/fake-news-has-become-an-existential-threat-85204.html>)

I think is it important to point out that false news has consequences. In a United Nations report by Investigator Yanghee Lee, Facebook activity was cited as one of the causes of genocide in Myanmar. Increasingly, governments have been finding that Facebook can be a useful tool to further their agendas — and if that agenda is killing people, so be it. You might recall that Hillary Clinton recently called out Facebook as one of the key causes of her loss, charging that it basically had worked as an agent for Russia during the 2016 campaign. I am still amazed that the government can say both that Russia interfered with the presidential election and that it did not change the outcome, without a full audit. The irony is that an audit would have shown Clinton won, but the Republicans tried to do an audit and the Democrats blocked them. Granted, Facebook clearly says that Russia didn’t impact the election — and of course, Facebook, which would be culpable if this were not true, isn’t exactly the most trusted source for this conclusion. In short, the massive amount of fake news already has had a material impact on many people’s lives and, as the United Nations has pointed out, may be responsible for ending a substantial number of them. Wrapping Up It isn’t just Trump fatigue but fake news fatigue that concerns me. There is so much false information floating around that it is having a material impact on the quality of our lives — and for some of us, how long those lives will be (I did warn you). Our inability to separate what is real from what is false quickly has become an existential risk. Faked news promotes anger, pointless fights and stock market swings. If we don’t get our arms around this soon, both individually and collectively, I’m worried about our survival.

### 1NC

#### ADVANTAGE CP:

#### The United States federal government should enact a substantial opioid education program, decriminalize opioid use, and increase the availability of medical treatment for opioid use.

#### Solves. If we kick it, the 1AC concedes alt causes. [KU = blue]

Kim 17— Major Jacob J. Kim, U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer Specializing in the Latin American and Northeast Asian Regions, M.A. in Latin American Studies from the University of California Los Angeles, Dissertation on Mexican Drug Cartel Influence in Government, Society, and Culture in 2014, 8-28-2017, Accessed: 10-4-2017, "Solving the Opioid National Security Crisis" Real Clear Defense, <https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/08/28/solving_the_opioid_national_security_crisis_112158.html>

Opioid addiction in the United States has quickly become a complex crisis with enormous implications. Overdose deaths involving opioids nearly tripled from 1999 to 2014, and they currently claim the lives of approximately 142 people every day.[1], [2] Experts say opioid related deaths could kill nearly 500,000 Americans in the next decade.[3] The greatest culprits and beneficiaries of this epidemic are Mexico’s drug cartels, which provide more than 90 percent of America’s heroin and rake in billions in profit.[4] As long as demand for the drug in the U.S. remains high, Mexico’s drug traffickers and cartels will continue to flourish. Significantly decreasing demand for illicit opioids in the U.S. is the most effective way to reduce the power of these cartels, and this can only be done through a combination of education, legalization, and effective medical treatment. One Problem Fuels the Other America’s addiction to illicit drugs is the Mexican drug cartels’ primary source of income. It has always been this way, but the drug of choice has changed. Trafficking of opioids such as fentanyl and heroin is now more profitable than marijuana and cocaine, and cartels have ramped up local production of opioids significantly since 2013.[5] The profitability of opioids has become so high that gangs of rival drug cartels in Mexico are going to war to control poppy fields, which the federal government struggles to find and destroy.[6] In the U.S., the demand for opioids shows no sign of abating, as addicts in all 50 states abuse everything from overprescribed OxyContin to more lethal opioids such as fentanyl and heroin. If the demand for opioids in the U.S. were to decrease, Mexican drug cartels would likely lose a proportional amount of money and power.

### 1NC

#### RACIAL CAPITALISM K:

#### The plan strengthens free markets and saves capitalism.

Parakkal & Bartz-Marvez 13, \*Assistant Professor of International Relations, Philadelphia University, \*\*Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Miami. (Raju, Sherry, Winter 2013, “Capitalism, democratic capitalism, and the pursuit of antitrust laws”, The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 58, No. 4, DOI: 10.1177/0003603X1305800409)

Antitrust laws have historically been associated with countries that possess a free-market capitalist economy, which is understood as an economic system in which competition and the market forces of demand and supply determine economic outcomes. This historical association between capitalism and antitrust laws is evident from the fact that the countries that first adopted national antitrust laws, such as Canada, the United States, and the countries of Western Europe, are countries that have long embraced a market economy. On the contrary, the statist economies of the erstwhile Soviet bloc and many developing countries, for the most part, did not institute antitrust laws of the type associated with free market economies. Notwithstanding these country examples, which indicate a positive association between a capitalist economic system and antitrust laws, there exist arguments that both support and oppose antitrust laws for a capitalist economy. Arguments in support of antitrust laws for a capitalist economy begin with the fundamental understanding that the most important ingredient of a capitalist system is market competition. The presence of a competitive market is vital to achieving the efficiency levels that a capitalist economy seeks. Therefore, competitive forces need to be protected to discipline the market players, especially the dominant ones. By preventing and punishing anticompetitive practices by market players, an antitrust law protects and promotes market competition. 1 In the United States, which is commonly understood to be the leading bastion of free-market capitalism and one of the first countries to enact an antitrust law, the role of antitrust legislation in preserving the capitalist character of its economic system is underscored by the near-constitutional status accorded to its antitrust statues by the U.S. Supreme Court. 2 The Court described these statutes as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise” and “as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.”3 Such a sentiment is appropriate, given that the American antitrust law, the Sherman Act, was passed in 1890 to protect economic competition from rapidly-growing “trusts.”4 While the social and political zeitgeist has changed considerably since the passing of the Sherman Act, the fact remains that antitrust is perceived as key to “protecting consumers against anticompetitive conduct that raises prices, reduces output, and hinders innovation and economic growth.”5 Moreover, it is understood that “competition is a public good, and society cannot expect the victims of anticompetitive conduct to protect themselves.”6 The implication therefore is that government power, through the enforcement of antitrust statutes, is critical to reining in corporate power in order to protect economic competition and capitalism.

#### Focus on healthcare entrepreneurship atomizes care and precludes collective responses to public health crises.

Viana & da Silva 19, \*Ana Luiza d’Ávila Viana, Departamento de Medicina Preventiva, Faculdade de Medicina, Universidade de São Paulo. \*\*Hudson Pacifico da Silva, Institut de Recherche en Santé Publique, Université de Montréal. (“Neoliberal meritocracy and financial capitalism: consequences for social protection and health”, *Ciência & Saúde Coletiva*, 23(7), pg. 2108, DOI: 10.1590/1413-81232018237.07582018)

Ten years after the publication of the article entitled Economia política da saúde: introduzindo o debate (Political economy of health: introducing the debate)1 , written by the authors of the present article and professor Paulo Elias, there are obvious tensions between healthcare understood as a right and collective (or public) good and healthcare as a private good in the wake of the rapid global advance of the commodification of both funding and provision of healthcare services. These tensions – over healthcare services, which are increasingly delivered by multinational corporations with business activities in various sectors and dependent on the financial cycle, and over funding, given that individuals are having to take increasing responsibility for ensuring they have access to health actions and services – are being transformed into antagonism and threat.

In the abovementioned article, we talked exactly about the tensions inherent in the idea of health as a right and universal collective/public good and health as a private good. From the latter perspective, health service provision is brought closer to the logic of ownership and funding ceases to be a collective responsibility in the form of general taxation, becoming dependent upon ability to pay, without solidarity between different segments of society – the healthy and the sick, the rich and the poor, the young and the old. As highlighted by the World Health Organization (WHO), out-of-pocket payments (OPP) are the least equitable way to finance health systems and one of the major causes of impoverishment, particularly in low and middle-income countries, where OPP remain the primary source of funding2.

This amounts to an abrogation of the collective responsibility for health, whereby responsibility for individual health and risk is left solely with the individual and access to health services is held hostage to the numerous purchasing mechanisms (paying up front, installments, and individual and group payment schemes), according to individual and family income, in a confusing mosaic of individual and collective forms, both belonging to the market cycle.

The entrepreneurization of public sector healthcare provision3 and financialization and internationalization of healthcare (health insurance companies, health plan operators and service providers)4,5 are a major move away from the provision of free health services as a public good (in the case of national health systems) and social security as a public policy (in the case of contributory health systems) towards ownership-individual, production-rentier logic (market-based health systems).

#### Pursuit of military dominance entrenches domestic policing and stokes instability.

Kizer 20, MA, Policy Director at Win Without War. (Kate, 6-10-2020, "US Hegemony Relies on Dehumanization and White Supremacy", *Inkstick*, <https://inkstickmedia.com/us-hegemony-relies-on-dehumanization-and-white-supremacy/>)

When I began writing this column, Black Hawk helicopters were still circling over Washington, DC, flying low to intimidate and disperse protestors demanding justice for yet another murder of an unarmed Black person, this time George Floyd by Minneapolis police.

While the spread of popular uprisings against police brutality across the United States feels like an unprecedented tipping point, the impunity with which police and military forces operate is not new. Nor is it isolated to domestic policing. The willingness to weaponize state power against those expressing their discontent and calls for change has long been a part of both US domestic and foreign policy.

Some Washington national security professionals have made laudable statements committing to do better to address the structural inequities that keep the profession majority-white and cis-male in the face of this repression. Yet these efforts have not addressed the fundamental problem at hand: the state violence taking place in streets across the United States is a natural outgrowth of decades, if not centuries of domestic and foreign policy that first and foremost relies on the dehumanization of Black and brown people to pursue hegemony at home and abroad. Until we reckon with this fundamental truth, we will continue to fail to actually address the institutionalized and structural racism that has led to decade after decade of state violence against Black people in this country and people of color around the world.

In the United States, this dehumanization has its roots in the founding of our country. The prosperity the white majority in the United States enjoys today cannot be divorced from the genocide of Indigenous people and the enslavement of Africans, all for the economic benefit of white colonizers. The violent domination of the white colonial project and its basis in exploitation and white saviorism not only defined the foundations of early US society, but is echoed today here at home, and in US foreign policy.

For decades, the United States military has used many of the same tactics abroad that are used against Black and brown people by police in the United States. The use of force is never a last resort, but instead the preferred tool to ensure submission. Local conditions, individual experiences, and other drivers to violence, dissent, or crime – often rooted in governance failure, human rights abuses, and economic and/or political disenfranchisement – are ignored. Instead, a more pernicious, dangerous motive is assigned to all members of subjugated groups once one individual decides to resort to violence or commit a crime.

A violent response is then justified in cloaked language about patriotism, security, and saviorism. The United States military is undertaking dangerous missions against “extremists” to “save” the Afghan people, to “secure freedom” for Iraqis; just as in the United States police are keeping the streets of the US “safe,” tracking “extremists” that threaten the status quo and private property. As the experience of the past several weeks has shown, however, violence from the oppressive force ultimately begets more defiance. The idea that violence can quell dissension is ultimately rooted in the orientalist, racist belief that non-white people are inherently threats that must ultimately be silenced in order for stability to take hold.

The US government’s use of force is continuously justified by its stated intention to create safety — but safety for whom? Surely not the countless innocents killed in endless wars abroad, the diaspora communities surveilled, or the Black people murdered by police here at home. The Trump administration’s current militarized response to the popular uprisings sweeping the country is merely an outgrowth of long-standing policies that have devalued Black and brown lives, and ignored the unique injustices and inequities these communities face in achieving safety, well-being, and liberation. The post-9/11 police state and outdated slavery-era laws merely provide useful levers for Trump to pull in the face of this new challenge to his power.

If people in power continue to see these latest instances of violence and repression as isolated, unfortunate instances that “don’t reflect who we are as a nation,” then we will have failed to truly challenge and disrupt the forces and systems at play that have allowed white supremacy to infiltrate every aspect of US public life, including foreign policy.

#### The 1AC in anchored in a rationalist economic model that’s prefigured to naturalize conquest and racial exploitation.

Hardin & Towns 19, \*Carolyn, Assistant Professor of Media and Communication & American Studies @ Miami University. \*\*Armond R., Department of Communication Studies @ The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. (December 2019, “Plastic Empowerment: Financial Literacy and Black Economic Life”, *American Quarterly*, Volume 71, Number 4, pg. 978-980)

Homo Economicus’s Others: Black Objects and Black Debt

One of the financial literacy programs run by the government, Money Smart, is a free “instructor-led curriculum” that can be taught in “a classroom or small group setting.”56 The curriculum covers “deposit and credit services offered by financial institutions, choosing and maintaining a checking account, spending plans, the importance of saving, how to obtain and use credit effectively, and the basics of building or repairing credit.”57 These materials, among many others, display the basic and well-established assumptions of financial literacy education: that individual financial stability requires rational calculations and decision-making. In other words, financial literacy is a normative project to bring individuals into compliance with the simplistic assumptions of economic models, or what James Kwak terms “economism.”58 As such, financial literacy acknowledges and seeks to remediate what behavioral economists have long noted: that models do not match reality because individuals do not act rationally.59 However, if individuals can be made to act rationally, optimal economic outcomes can be achieved. In other words, the purpose of financial literacy is to make each of us a well-functioning and rational “homo economicus,” the idealized subject of free market capitalism.

Financial literacy is just the latest narrative to deploy a version of homo economicus as the baseline subject of economic rationality. Although the term is said to have originated only in the nineteenth century in response to the writing of John Stuart Mill, the notion of a “proper” capitalist subject who acts correctly within various models of capitalism is much older.60 It is also a raced subject. The history of capitalism reveals that the dominant notion of economic rationality is constructed as/in a white subject over and against black bodies both as objects rather than subjects of capitalism and as intense targets of exploitative debt. This racial tension at the heart of economic rationality reveals the racial stakes of calls for financial literacy education of black consumers.

White Subject, Black Object

According to Michel Foucault, the homo economicus of the late twentieth century eschews the early political economic concern of buying and selling one’s own labor power—with all its potentially collectivist political implications—for the individualized pursuit of self-interest “as an entrepreneur of himself.”61 Foucault offers as evidence Gary Becker’s universalizing idea of “human capital.” Homo economicus is he who can solve any social problem by accumulating human capital that produces an earnings stream for the entrepreneur of himself. But this entrepreneurial self-determination is not equally accessible by all raced subjects. According to Denise Ferreira da Silva, the black is not self-determined but “outer-determined,” which is to say, always open to being “affected,” manipulated by the Western subject for his own benefit.62 The black, then, functions as one about whom choices are made, not one who makes choices.

Sylvia Wynter provides the most explicit argument of the overrepresentation of homo economicus as white within the Western construct of the human, which she argues cannot be disarticulated from capitalism. Indeed, homo economicus emerges out of the shift from the Renaissance’s conceptions of politics and Western Judeo-Christianity as signifiers of the human, what she calls “Man1,” to “Man2,” or “a figure based on the Western bourgeoisie’s model of being human that has been articulated as, since the latter half of the nineteenth century, liberal monohumanism’s homo oeconomicus.”63 Likewise, Lisa Tilley argues that Wynter’s homo economicus is a revision of a racialized humanness, “formulated within the colonial episteme’s Darwinian distortions as divided between the naturally selected (Europeans) and the naturally ‘dysselected’ (those racialized as naturally inferiority).”64 Wynter finds the origins of this shift in humanness in the “colonial matrix of power.”65 In her essay “1492,” she argues that Christopher Columbus functioned as a racialized turning point for Europe, one that replaced Western religious conceptions of knowledge, such as the world being flat, with secularized conceptions of the world.66 Further, Columbus’s voyage had as much to do with spreading Chris- tianity and glorifying the Spanish nation as it did with enriching “himself and his family with all the gold and tribute he could extort from the indigenous peoples, even from making some into cabezas de indios y indias (heads of Indian men and women), who could be sold as slaves.”67

Wynter notes that Columbus is often positioned in terms of celebratory American “discovery” in ways that brush over the colonial, nationalistic, and imperialistic implications of his individual financial aspirations and the objectification of black bodies on which those aspirations depended. Walter Mignolo follows Wynter, providing some insight into the racial foundations of homo economicus, particularly connecting it to Western colonialism and imperialism, both of which are inseparable from the post-Columbian context.68 Mignolo argues that the self-interested optimization that fleshes out the figure of homo economicus assumes coloniality and imperialism.69 In effect, Western colonial enrichment—at the expense of indigenous racial others of Europe—is already inherent in the “economic rationality” of homo economicus, as it is seen as a financially rational tool of enrichment, rather than a moral wrong.

Elsewhere Wynter claims that the proto-notion of homo economicus that circulated in the sixteenth century underwent important transformations by the nineteenth century. Further removed from Judeo-Christianity, conceptions of economic rationality in the nineteenth century functioned in raced form to articulate both black and indigenous populations in the “New World” as the epitome of economic irrationality. Wynter notes that by the nineteenth century, the black slave “would now be made into the physical referent of the ostensibly most racially inferior and non-evolved Other to Man, itself redefined as optimally homo economicus.”70 The black slave is in effect the defining opposite of homo economicus, that nonbeing who is less than human and/ or not human at all. Where homo economicus is self-interested and free to choose—the subject who can fulfill the ultimate human goal of surplus accumulation on his own—the slave is utterly removed from not only this goal but even the possibility of choosing or acting within the construct of the self.

#### Racial capitalism subordinates billions and threatens extinction.

Gonzalez 20, Morris I. Leibman Professor of Law at Loyola University Chicago School of Law and Professor Emerita at Seattle University School of Law. (Carmen, 10-27-2020, "Climate Change and Racial Capitalism", *LPE Project*, <https://lpeproject.org/blog/climate-change-and-racial-capitalism/>)

Racialized communities have borne the brunt of the carbon-based capitalist world economy from its colonial origins through the contemporary climate crisis. They have been enslaved, exploited, dispossessed, and subjected to both the physical violence of invasion and occupation and the structural “slow violence” of polluting industry. From the Niger Delta to the Canadian tar sands, racially subordinated populations living in the shadows of oil drilling, coal mining, oil and gas pipelines, power plants, refineries, and petrochemical plants are poisoned by toxic chemicals and treated as surplus and disposable. In my article in the inaugural issue of JLPE, I break new ground by examining climate change and climate change-induced displacement through the framework of racial capitalism. Drawing upon the work of political theorist Cedric Robinson and sociologist Aníbal Quijano, I treat racism and capitalism as inextricably intertwined. Robinson argues that capitalism emerged from a feudal order thoroughly infused with racial (or proto-racial) hierarchies. Quijano identifies Europe’s violent conquest of the Americas as the pivotal event that globalized white supremacy and established the capitalist world economy. Both have analyzed how racism makes oppression socially acceptable by portraying large segments of humanity as inferior, unworthy, and expendable. In my article, I focus on how the global capitalist order has used racism to create the conditions for the massive unchecked resource extraction that has caused global climate change and for pushing the burden of its impacts onto those who are most vulnerable and least responsible. CLIMATE INJUSTICE Climate change is caused primarily by the world’s most affluent inhabitants but threatens the lives and livelihoods of those who contributed least to the problem. As climate change intensifies, those most susceptible to climate-related disasters and displacement are also overwhelmingly persons classified as non-white. They reside in vulnerable geographic locations (such as coastal zones, the Arctic, and the Pacific island states), and have been deprived of the resources to protect themselves from harm through centuries of predatory economic policies. Despite the disproportionate impact of climate change on vulnerable populations who have been largely ignored due to their racialization, legal scholarship on climate displacement has often adopted a doctrinal approach that fails to analyze the underlying systemic causes of the climate crisis and its relationship to race and racism. I focus on international law in particular. CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW International law has mounted an inadequate response to the climate crisis. The climate treaties have failed to curb global temperature increases, and have delivered insufficient adaptation assistance to climate-vulnerable states and peoples. Even though climate-related disasters and slow-onset events (such as sea level rise) threaten to displace millions of people, international law provides very limited protection to persons who flee their country of origin to escape the ravages of climate change. Neither the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the treaties governing climate change requires countries to admit climate-displaced persons. Part of the problem is that international law has been complicit in the project of racial capitalism. As Antony Anghie explains, international law originates in the colonial encounter and has justified successive Northern interventions in the Global South through a variety of doctrines – including terra nullius, the doctrine of discovery, the mandate system, trusteeship, modernization, and development. International law has depicted Southern peoples as so primitive, savage, uncivilized, backward, and under-developed that their lives, livelihoods, and cultures are unworthy of protection. It has also created the rules and institutions of the capitalist world system through which Northern states and transnational corporations maintain an iron grip on the states and people of the South, including trade law, foreign investment law, and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. EMERGING LEGAL AND POLICY RESPONSES TO CLIMATE DISPLACEMENT In the absence of a binding legal framework, three emerging legal and policy responses to climate displacement threaten to reinforce racialized hierarchies and to trap large segments of humanity in places that are becoming uninhabitable. First, the national security response constructs climate-displaced persons as barbarians crashing the gates of civilization, and has fostered the criminalization, detention, and expulsion of migrants. Second, the humanitarian response reinforces racial hierarchies by portraying climate-displaced persons as primitive, backward, and in need of charity rather than justice. Its voluntary initiatives to protect disaster-displaced persons obscure the Global North’s responsibility for climate change and have little chance of succeeding at a time of rising nationalism and xenophobia. Third, the migration management response encourages climate-displaced persons to finance climate resilience in their home countries through temporary labor migration. This approach shifts responsibility for climate change adaptation from affluent states to exploitable workers from the world’s poorest and most climate-vulnerable populations. The exodus of able-bodied workers may also exacerbate the vulnerability of “trapped populations” (darker-skinned, older, disabled) by producing a brain drain, labor shortages, and reliance on erratic remittance flows. A JUST SOLUTION TO CLIMATE DISPLACEMENT? Another way is possible. Climate-vulnerable states and peoples have called for an approach to climate displacement grounded in their collective right to self-determination and to legal continuity as self-governing communities on the territories of other states. This proposal deserves consideration. Successful implementation of it requires a responsibility-based framework that imposes obligations on affluent states to finance the mobility decisions of climate-displaced populations based on their contribution to the climate crisis. The self-determination approach is an example of the ways that Southern states and peoples are developing counter-hegemonic interpretations of international law that will permit them to shape their own history and transcend the colonially-imposed borders that impede mobility and increase climate vulnerability. An analysis of climate displacement grounded in racial capitalism must identify who benefits from policies that stoke racism and militarize borders. These beneficiaries include the corporations that provide surveillance, border walls, and detention facilities; the security apparatus of the state; the businesses that exploit undocumented or incarcerated migrants; and the authoritarian populists who demonize migrants in order to persuade working class whites to support policies that intensify economic inequality and hasten catastrophic climate change. Although greenhouse gases do not respect national borders, national elites deploy racialized systems of border control to perpetuate the illusion that persons classified as white can somehow escape the economic and ecological ravages of capitalism by erecting walls and fortresses. Racism enables states and corporations to pursue policies catastrophic to the planet and its inhabitants because the worst and most immediate consequences are inflicted on stigmatized populations in the sacrifice zones of the fossil fuel economy. While focusing on the problem of climate displacement, the article uses the framework of racial capitalism to highlight how the struggles for racial, economic, and climate justice are interconnected and interdependent. Racism creates divisions between people whose economic and ecological vulnerability should serve as the basis for solidarity and resistance. As economic inequality increases and the planet’s ecosystems are brought to the brink of collapse, all but the ultra-affluent will become frontline communities in an increasingly damaged and dangerous world. Deconstructing racial hierarchies is necessary in order to foster the collective action required to avert climate catastrophe. Climate change is not an isolated crisis, but a symptom of an economic (dis)order that jeopardizes the future of life on this planet. Through a race-conscious analysis of climate change grounded in political economy, this article seeks to engage scholars in a variety of disciplines in order to develop more robust critiques of the laws, institutions, and ideologies that maintain racial capitalism and pose an existential threat to humanity.

#### Vote neg to reject the aff and affirm place-based resistance.

Bledsoe et al. 19, \*Adam, assistant professor in the Department of Geography and African American Studies Program at Florida State University. \*\*Tyler McCreary, assistant professor in the Department of Geography at Florida State University, \*\*\*Willie Jamaal Wright, assistant professor of geography at Florida State University. (“Theorizing diverse economies in the context of racial capitalism”, *Geoforum*, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.07.004>)

As acknowledged in the literature above, unorthodox value systems and modes of production are often present within Black-led cooperatives. Through collective community-building initiatives by groups like Cooperation Jackson and Cooperative Community of New West Jackson, Jackson has risen as a promising place for the incubation and application of economic, spatial, and political alternatives. Applying the analytic of marronage to discussions of commoning can contribute timely, place-based contributions to the study of cooperatives and the commons. Thinking of the commons, particularly of urban commons, through a lens of marronage may help residents and organizers in selecting and acquiring common property as well as in recreating modes of living beyond and before the (re)imposition of capital. Though communities are adept at determining their needs, as efforts such as D-Town Farms and the CCNWJ indicate, making academic resources, concepts, and methods available to collective and cooperative practices may lead to any number of fruitful and unforeseen outcomes. Finally, as residents and researchers are not immune to the trappings of spatial imaginaries based in logics of individual ownership (see Wright and Herman, 2018), an analytic of marronage has the potential to influence the spatial imaginaries of residents and researchers, alike, so that more of us come to view landscapes of marronage as more than blank slates for capitalist development but as the future of innumerable publics.

7. Conclusion

Analyses of racial capitalism are necessary in the drive to create alternatives to capitalism. If diverse economies hope to address phenomena like urban decay, gentrification, and environmental degradation, they must first recognize that notions of racial difference make such arrangements possible. Urban disinvestment, the repurposing of urban space, and the treatment of spaces as empty contribute directly to the reproduction of capitalist modes of production. In the context of North America, these mechanisms of accumulation occur precisely because the communities most affected by them remain subordinated to logics of conquest. The afterlives of settler colonialism and chattel slavery inform the realities of present-day capitalism, as the displacement and spatial fixing of Indigenous and Black populations—central to the initial rise of global capitalism—continue to be central characteristics of capital accumulation. Creating alternatives to capitalism thus means first recognizing how conquest continues to structure capitalist modes of production.

In the examples given above, Black and Indigenous communities provide clear analyses of the logics and concrete economic factors that oppress them. In recognizing how economic abandonment and intentional disinvestment from city spaces serve to reproduce capitalism and oppress their communities, Black communities in Detroit and Jackson and Indigenous communities in Winnipeg and Minneapolis offer a grounded theory of racial capitalism. These communal analyses explore particular manifestations of present-day capitalism, uncovering how capital accumulation takes place via the oppression of racialized populations. More importantly, these communities push beyond a diagnosis of oppressive dynamics and create place-specific alternatives to the expressions of capitalism they encounter. The establishment of public housing in Winnipeg and Minneapolis and the cultivation of commons through practices of marronage in Detroit and Jackson both entail alternatives to the forms of capitalism that displace the Indigenous and Black communities present in those cities. These communities, then, employ an analysis of racial capitalism to enact diverse economies.

Literature on diverse economies and actual, material creations of alternatives to capitalism can look to examples like those described above as they try to envision and implement economies that do not reproduce capitalist modes of production. Winnipeg, Minneapolis, Detroit, and Jackson are hardly the only locations in which capitalism has taken hold, and different locations will have to wage their own struggles against the specific forms of capitalism they face. Nonetheless, the movements described in this paper offer an important blueprint for how analysis and praxis can walk hand in hand. To create futures not dominated by capitalism requires both an honest assessment of the workings of racial capitalism and the ability to create alternatives to such arrangements. Looking to examples like those above are a starting point from which we can take both of these steps.

## ADV 1

#### No Mexican state collapse -- experts

Daudelin, 12 - Professor @ Carleton, development and conflict (Jean, “The State And Security in Mexico” http://books.google.com/books?id=o-Tu81Bq6s4C&pg=PA127&lpg=PA127&dq=mexico+state+collapse&source=bl&ots=Yhx\_8YtFb4&sig=pa7WFUmTZL9ABazqwXvl8euUKw&hl=en&sa=X&ei=46UHVNGWOIfxgwSRlYDACg&ved=0CB8Q6AEwATgU#v=onepage&q=mexico%20state%20collapse&f=false)

A careful look at the evidence and the fact that the U.S. seems to be disengaging from what has ultimately been a limited involvement in the region's drug and organized-crime scene suggests that, from whichever angle one looks at the problem, the latter does not represent a very significant threat to U.S. security. In that context, a sizable increase in Canada's involvement can hardly be justified by the dangers the problem represents to its main ally. The prospects of narco-traffickers provoking a state collapse in Mexico are essentially nonexistent, notwithstanding alarmist declarations by some U.S. public officials.14 No reputable expert on the country has supported that view.54 Such prospects for Guatemala, Honduras, or even El Salvador are much less far-fetched, however, which is why an effort is currently being made by the World Bank, the European Union, the U.S., and Canada to bolster the region's governments\* individual and collective capacity to confront the organized-crime challenge." It is difficult to argue, however, that the emergence of a narco-state or some kind of state collapse in Central America and the Caribbean would represent a significant threat for Canada itself. These regions—Central America and Haiti in particular—have long been plagued by corruption, violence, and instability and have previously-seen long episodes of civil war without any ripple effect on Canada. Were such developments to occur, they would create, relative to North America, the situation that currently exists in the urban peripheries of large Latin American countries, such as Colombia or Brazil, whose stability and economic prospects are not significantly impacted by the anarchy and violence that prevail in small "uncontrolled territories."

#### Grinberg’s only qual is being a U.S. military officer.

#### Their portrayal of Mexico is nonsensical fear mongering—Mexico is stable and becoming more so

Cowen 10/19/21, Reporter for Bloomberg News, (Tyler, Could Mexico Be the Next Denmark? https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-10-19/mexico-could-be-the-next-denmark-unspectacular-but-stable)

There, I said it. I realize that many people view Mexico as dangerous and corrupt, but the more basic facts are the more important ones, especially for investors and economists: Mexico has one of the higher per capita incomes of the emerging economies, it draws upon many vibrant cultures, and it is located right next to the U.S. If my enthusiasm isn’t enough to make you bullish on Mexico, listen to the many Central Americans who say Mexico is becoming too similar to the U.S., particularly in terms of excess commercialization. This criticism is itself evidence of progress. The debate about Mexico in the U.S. tends to focus on the differences between the two countries. A broader perspective is more insightful. Now, about that crime and corruption: By some estimates 20% of Mexican territory is controlled by drug gangs, and the country has a high murder rate. These issues won’t go away entirely, if only because they reflect demand for drugs in Mexico’s northern neighbor. But they are likely to become more manageable. As Mexico grows wealthier, the central and state governments will be able to establish greater control over their territory. And though the U.S. cannot usefully control many events in Mexico, its financial support of the Mexican government provides stability. Mexico’s government is also notoriously corrupt, and currently it has populist and especially irresponsible leaders. That too is likely to improve with greater state capacity. Mexico now has a middle class that votes, and it expects something in return for the taxes it pays. In the meantime, there are reasons to be bullish on Mexico right now. One is that economic globalization has been somewhat halted, and in some areas even reversed. To the extent Americans do not trust Chinese supply chains, the Mexican economy will pick up some of the slack. Mexico is also the natural lower-wage supplier to North American industry. (Its main problem in this regard is that its wages are no longer so low, but that too reflects its progress.) And if tourism in Asia and Europe remains difficult or inconvenient, Americans will visit Mexico more and grow accustomed to holidaying in locales other than Cancun. Some of those habits are likely to stick. Mexico, like much of Latin America, also has a burgeoning startup scene, especially in ecommerce and fintech. Mexico City might end up as the technology capital of Latin America. That would help with one of Mexico’s chronic economic problems, namely that small firms decide to stay small to escape regulations and taxes. Successful tech startups, in contrast, can scale more easily and face fewer regulations on average than manufacturing firms. Another reason to be bullish on Mexico: Recent data show that Latino immigrants to the U.S. assimilate remarkably well. Many of them have Mexican heritage, and may be a source of business capital and collaborations for Mexico proper. They also provide a steady reminder that prosperity is possible, and not just for Americans of Anglo heritage. I have been traveling to Mexico for almost 40 years, and each time I visit the country seems to be doing better. The prosperity seems broader-based, which lowers the degree of de facto racial and skin-color-based segregation in the country. And unlike much of the world, Mexico does not face national security issues from potentially invading or attacking rivals. That advantage may assume increasing importance, as competitors to Mexico have to deal with problems from China, Russia or other sources. Many investors and economists have been unduly pessimistic about Mexico because it has not grown at the pace of China. At this point, it’s best to concede that it probably never will. Yet many of the world’s more successful countries, such as Denmark, never had major growth spurts as China did. Instead, they managed a steady pace of growth with a few big dips. Mexico, with its strong connections to the U.S., is well-positioned to achieve that kind of growth stability over the coming decades. Unlike in the 1980s, the Mexican central bank is run by well-educated technocrats. Even during the pandemic, which hit the Mexican economy very hard, credit ratings remained acceptable.

#### Their linking of Mexico as a failed state due to drug cartels is the ideology of racism

Amaya 20, Professor of Communication at the University of Southern California. (Hector, Trafficking: Narcoculture in Mexico and the United States, google books).

This chapter engages one important way in which criminal drug violence structures the US public spheres, one that quickly and potentially dramatically, connect to Mexico's, the idea of a failed state and its links to violence and international intervention. Although the view that Mexico is becoming a failed state is not hegemonic in Mexico or in the United States, this view has been tactically used in both countries to cast the problem of drug violence and trafficking into a geo problem that can and should be solved by Mexico quickly "or else," as the joint operating environment report (us Joint Forces command 2008) implies. The issue is not simply whether the US will intervene in Mexico's Affairs. As the previous chapter shows, it already does. The issue is the ideological nature of the discourse of failed states, with the discourse hides and what it shows. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section interrogates how the term failed state is deployed in relation to Mexico in the U.S. Majoritarian public sphere, represented here by the mainstream press. This analysis sheds light on the idiot logical by Aziz, Symantec dispositions, and hermeneutic tactics common among cultural Elites. Evidence comes from print and digital reports and opinion pieces public from 1990 to the end of 2013 in three powerful us Publications: USA Today, the New York Times, And The Washington Post. The analysis reveals a strong continuity in the discourse of treatment of crisis in Mexico and other nations, such as Somalia, Congo, and Haiti. There is, however, one significant difference. In regard to other nations, the idea of a failed state is applied to crises due to political issues including ethnic or religious divisions, territorial occupation, and economic problems due to policies, to name a few. Post-2008 references to Mexico failing are due chiefly to criminal activity. A crisis is a crisis, yet, I asked, are all crises equal? Are criminal and political crises equal? Aren't crises constructed in language? If so, what is the origin of the discourse of Crisis that allows a tool for politicalevaluation to be applied to criminal instances? What does the criminal and political equivalent tell us about the discourse of failed States? The second section answers these questions by noting a troubling continuity between this us discourse of violence in Mexico in early modern ideas about the state, a continuity that helps constitute a dangerous reductionism in our understanding of violence. This section shows that these equivalences are possible only if the state is defined through and by its relationship to violence and spatial sovereignty. Thus defined, I argue, politics is emptied from it's a genealogical connections to democracy and liberalism; it becomes the politics of absolutism and even fascism. In these political imaginaries, as in the political imaginary at root in the failed State discourse, the state is order, its failure is disorder. Where do these ideas about order come from? Answer this question reveals that contemporary ideas about orderly States and state failure cannot be understood without reference to the genealogy of order and its political economy. As Mark Neocleous (2006) has noted, this is one of Mark's as lessons in capital: order is not simply a normative value? But the outcome of particular ways of organizing political power and the economy. In the histories with which this chapter engages, these particular ways of organizing political power in the economy are intertwined with the histories of colonialism and the racial and ethnic ideologies this colonialism depended on.

#### Their use of the label “fragile” as applied to a state is offensive—Its only function is to position Mexico as inferior

Grotenhuis 16, associate researcher at Utrecht University, (Rene, Nation-Building as Necessary Effort in Fragile States, https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/id/a7235273-af76-4f05-87d3-95d1d49f37ca/619591.pdf)

The concepts central to this book are ‘nation’ – or ‘nation-building’ – ‘fragility’ and ‘identity’. All three are contested concepts of which no singular, agreed definition exists. As for nation, there are different opinions on the nation as modern or historic concept, whether a nation is, or should be, congruent with a state. As for fragility, scholars dispute whether this one term can cover the diverse realities and challenges of the states that suffer the predicament. Others point at the fact that the term ‘fragile state’ is a derogatory label that serves no other purpose than to put people down or further alienate their governments from the world community. And identity could be approached from so many different perspectives (community, individual, ethnicity, class, religion) that it is hard to formulate a clear definition, let alone answer the question whether identity is a fixed or a flexible concept.

#### Their discourse of fragility is an act of neocolonialism

Sternehall 16, Thesis in Peace and Development Studies at Linneus University (Tove, Understanding State Fragility through the Actor-Network Theory: A Case Study of Post-Colonial Sudan, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1044570/FULLTEXT01.pdf)

Another idea of fragility is Rothkopf’s (2012) claim that all states could be defined as fragile, and that our current ranking is highly affected by the westernized view of what fragility and stability is. Rothkopf’s critique of the fragile states discourse touches upon the idea that the concept of state fragility is a neo-colonial tool used by the West to force their values onto, mainly, former colonies (Ayers, 2012). From this point of view, former colonial masters and current global powers are using programs such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to violate other states’ sovereignty (ibid). Another set of critique is aimed at the definition of state fragility in terms of state capacity, which is based on the fact that many donor countries involved with foreign intervention uses definitions that ignores the political nature of states (Larémont, 2005, 2). This is due to the fact that when state-reconstruction is focused on building social and political institutions from a technical and ‘objective’ point of view, it often results in structures that overlooks the social and political struggles that may exist in society (Hameiri, 2007). As a result of this critique, development agencies have since 2011 included ‘legitimate politics’ as a part of their state-building programs (Larémont, 2005, 2).

#### No leadership impact---empirics.

Fettweis 20, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. (Christopher J., 6-3-2020, "Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/delusions-danger-geopolitical-fear-indispensability-us-foreign-policy)

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability.

Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend.

## ADV 2

#### Drug prices aren’t responsible for high healthcare spending

Lieberman 20, \*Steve M. Lieberman, MA, MPhil, non-resident fellow in economic studies at the Center for Health Policy, Schaeffer Initiative for Innovation in Health Policy, Brookings Institution. \*\*Paul B. Ginsburg, PhD, Chair in Health Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution and directs the USC-Brookings Schaeffer Initiative for Health Policy. He is also professor of health policy at USC and the director of public policy at the USC Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics. \*\*\*Kavita K. Patel, MD, MSHS, a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution and a primary care physician. (11-25-2020, "Balancing Lower U.S. Prescription Drug Prices And Innovation – Part 2", *Health Affairs*, https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20201123.114048/full/)

Despite concerns that deep price cuts would harm innovation, participants also acknowledged the imperative to slow U.S. spending growth, not just for drugs but for health care overall, as the nation spent almost 18 percent of gross domestic product on health care in 2018. Spending on retail prescription drugs (at 11 percent of personal health care spending in 2018) is still a relatively small slice of overall U.S. health care spending, and multiple participants argued that squeezing drug prices in isolation will do little to solve the overall cost and quality problems in U.S. health care. “Nobody tells you about the lousy [U.S. health care] delivery. We're down around the Dominican Republic in terms of outcomes…. It's really disastrous in terms of cost,” a participant said.

#### Healthcare costs are declining.

AHA 21, American Hospital Association. (2-17-2021, "Study: U.S. health spending falls for first time in 60 years in 2020, with 7% decline for hospital care", https://www.aha.org/news/headline/2021-02-17-study-us-health-spending-falls-first-time-60-years-2020-7-decline-hospital)

Annual spending for health care declined by 2% in 2020, including a 7% decline in spending for hospital care, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, according to a preliminary analysis by Altarum.

That’s the first decline in annual health spending since at least 1960, when the government began tracking it. The decline for hospital care was second only to the decline for dental services (20%). While most health care providers saw declines, spending on prescription drugs rose by 6.1%.

#### Drug prices are declining---best data

Fein 21, PhD, CEO of Drug Channels Institute. (Adam J., 1-5-2021, "Surprise! Brand-Name Drug Prices Fell (Again) in 2020", *Drug Channels*, <https://www.drugchannels.net/2021/01/surprise-brand-name-drug-prices-fell.html>)

It was another year of unexpected drug price developments. In 2020, brand-name drug net prices dropped for the third consecutive year. Meanwhile, brand-name drug list prices grew at their slowest rate in at least 20 years. See our updated analysis below. I also review the factors behind declining brand-name drug prices. These factors are firmly in place for 2021. Our new Congress may try tackle drug prices in the new year. Let’s hope that their policy perceptions catch up to today’s realities. DATA DISAMBIGUATION To examine drug pricing, we rely on data from SSR Health, an independent organization that collects and reports data on pharmaceutical prices. SSR Health is widely regarded as the leading provider of these data. In a testament to SSR Health’s influence, the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER) relies on these net price data in its cost-effectiveness evaluations. Read more about SSR Health on its US Brand Rx Net Pricing Tool webpage. SSR Health’s list and estimated net pricing figures are based on approximately 1,000 brand-name drugs with disclosed U.S. product-level sales from approximately 100 currently or previously publicly traded firms. The products and companies in the SSR Health numbers account for more than 90% of U.S. branded prescription net sales. SSR Health updates these figures quarterly, and its historical figures date from the first quarter of 2007.

#### No correlation between economic decline and war.

Walt 20, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. (Stephen M., 5/13/20, “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”, *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/)

On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”   
Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself.

The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success.

Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then.

The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term.

## ADV 3

#### The plan nukes innovation in every industry

Carlton et al. 16, \*Dennis W., David McDaniel Keller Professor of Economics, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago; Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research; \*\*Fredrick A. Flyer, Consultant, Compass Lexecon; \*\*\*Yoad Shef, Consultant, Compass Lexecon; Adjunct Professor, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago. (“DOES THE FTC’S THEORY OF PRODUCT HOPPING PROMOTE COMPETITION?”, *Journal of Competition Law & Economics*, 12(3), pg. 495-496, doi:10.1093/joclec/nhw025)


I. INTRODUCTION


The FTC’s novel “product hopping” theory has recently appeared in court cases and has led to publically reported FTC investigations.1 Courts have disagreed on the merits of the theory.2 According to this theory, under certain circumstances explained in more detail below, a firm can violate the antitrust laws by introducing a new product that harms its rivals and consumers. Rivals are supposedly harmed because they lose sales to the new product. Consumers are supposedly harmed because they are assumed to gain no significant therapeutic benefits from the new product compared to the old one but must pay a higher price for the new product. Although the FTC so far has applied the theory only to pharmaceuticals, nothing in the theory limits its application to the drug industry. The theory is at best a misguided attempt to fix a regulatory problem in the pharmaceutical industry associated with the Hatch-Waxman Act3 and is premised on the proposition that competition does not work. Using antitrust law to fix such a regulatory problem, assuming one exists, would not only potentially cause consumer harm in pharmaceutical markets, but also create an undesirable antitrust precedent for other industries.

Assuming for sake of argument that there is a problem to be fixed in pharmaceutical markets, the appropriate remedy would be to alter the regulation, as opposed to applying the antitrust laws, which is designed to address harm to competition and not harm caused by ineffective regulations. The objective of the antitrust laws is to promote market competition, based on the underlying assumption that such competition benefits rather than harms consumers. The creation, introduction, and promotion of new products and the protection of investments by limiting “free-riding” off these investments by other competing firms is desirable competitive behavior. To use the antitrust laws to condemn such behavior would therefore misuse antitrust law. Creating disincentives for firms to introduce new branded products, under the guise of “fixing” problems that exists only when viewed by the FTC in the context of Hatch-Waxman’s regulatory objectives, contradicts the antitrust law’s ultimate goal of promoting competition. Even worse, the consequence of attempting to fix the problem, if one indeed exists, through antitrust enforcement will be to chill incentives for product innovation in an industry where the most important health advances come from product innovations. Furthermore, such an attempt could also chill product innovation in other industries, because antitrust law applies broadly to all industries, and not merely the pharmaceutical industry.

#### 1AC internal link is from the Daily Telegraph. Throw it out.

MBFC 21, Media Bias/Fact Check. (Media Bias, 6-29-2021, "Daily Telegraph (UK)", Media Bias/Fact Check, https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/daily-telegraph/)





RIGHT BIAS

These media sources are moderately to strongly biased toward conservative causes through story selection and/or political affiliation. They may utilize strong loaded words (wording that attempts to influence an audience by using appeal to emotion or stereotypes), publish misleading reports, and omit information that may damage conservative causes. Some sources in this category may be untrustworthy. See all Right Bias sources.

#### Their disease securitization upholds a dehumanizing state of exception.

Melanie Armstrong (B.A., Communications, Brigham Young University, 2001 M.A., Telecommunications, Ohio University, 2003 Ph.D., American Studies, University of New Mexico, 2011) December 2011 [“BIO+TERROR: SCIENCE, SECURITY, SIMULATION” DISSERTATION Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy American Studies @The University of New Mexico, loghry]

Disease is a bearer of deviance, rendering some members of a population less healthy than others, but if the risk of disease can be calculated, then mechanisms of security can be put in place to regulate disease within a population. In his 1977-78 lectures, Security, Territory, Population, Michel Foucault theorized a population as a collection of living beings defined by their biological and pathological characteristics and subject to common mechanisms of governing. People’s relationship to disease changes with the ability to conceive of a population, for a level of disease might be tolerated within the population which cannot be accepted individually. Thus, mechanisms of security can be used to work against deviant cases of disease in order to maintain a “normal” condition of the population. The population, however, encompasses both those who are ill and those who are not, subjecting healthy bodies to the techniques of governing the sick for the promise of security for the whole. Because liberal subjects have the right and responsibility to govern their social interactions in order to ensure the security of the population, the mechanisms of security extend deeply into the many social conditions which produce disease risk. The biopreparedness plans undertaken by the city of Albuquerque exemplify how identifying and delineating the population enables the calculation of risk and determines the acts of governance which will care for the population when disease is introduced. Here, the common biological characteristic that defines the population is a shared vulnerability to disease, and the state is attempting to predetermine the extent of its care by identifying who shares that vulnerability. This case exemplifies how far the mechanisms of disease control might extend into the population, for the population is healthy in the present moment, but every individual is inscribed with the potential to become diseased. Furthermore, because disease is borne by living entities, it is also characterized by moments of sudden expansion and growth, which will continue unless checked by environmental or human-imposed controls, a moment Foucault labels “the crisis.”10 Each body within the population—even the presently healthy ones— contains within it the potential to create the crisis, requiring that the calculation of risk account for healthy bodies because they are vulnerable to disease and that acts to mitigate risk focus upon all members of the population who bear vulnerability. The state of emergency is thereby sustained when disease is not present, for a disease event might erupt at any moment and the healthy population bears within it the potential to become ill. Biosecurity can thereby be achieved by preparing for that moment of crisis, planning a response which will maintain the health of the population by containing the disease and preventing those moments of sudden expansion and growth.

# 2NC

## CP

#### Oh lord.

French 17— David French, J.D. from Harvard Law School, Senior Fellow at the National Review Institute, 4-28-2017, Date Accessed: 10-19-2017, "The Opioid Crisis Should Kill the Call to Legalize Hard Drugs" National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/447190/opioid-crisis-kill-movement-legalize-hard-drugs

There are no “rational actors” among addicts, and the substances are extraordinarily addictive. Do you know an opioid addict? Then you’ve seen them slide slowly away from reality

## K

#### 3---wars of accumulation---they trigger great-power conflict and turn the case

Burden-Stelly 20, Assistant Professor of Africana Studies and Political Science @ Carleton. (Charisse, 7-1-2020, "Modern U.S. Racial Capitalism: Some Theoretical Insights", *Monthly Review*, <https://monthlyreview.org/2020/07/01/modern-u-s-racial-capitalism/>)

In what remains of this essay, I will draw on the work of Black Marxist-Leninists and anticapitalists to explicate the defining features of modern U.S. racial capitalism—war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, labor superexploitation, and property by dispossession. In this, I demonstrate that their critiques and analyses offer a blueprint for theorizing modern U.S. racial capitalism.

War and militarism facilitate the endless drive for profit. Military conflicts between imperial powers result in the reapportioning of boundaries, possessions, and spheres of influence that often exacerbate racial and spatial economic subjection. War and militarism also perpetuate the endless construction of “threats,” primarily in racialized and socialist states, against which to defend progress, prosperity, freedom, and security. The manufacturing of conflict legitimates the mobilization of extraordinary violence to expropriate untold resources that produce relations of underdevelopment, dependency, extraversion, and disarticulation in the Global South. Moreover, the ruling elite and labor aristocracy in imperialist countries, not least the United States, wage perpetual war to defend their way of life and standard of living against the racialized majority who, because they would benefit most from the redistribution of the world’s wealth and resources, represent a perpetual threat.

Here, Du Bois’s 1915 essay, “The African Roots of War,” is instructive.34 Though he does not directly analyze the United States, he nonetheless demonstrates how racism, white supremacy, and the plunder of Africa underpinned the capitalist imperialist war that engulfed the world from July 1914 to November 1918—a war that catapulted the United States into the center of the capitalist world system. Using Du Bois’s own words, Hubert Harrison, the father of Harlem radicalism, makes the direct link:

But since every industrial nation is seeking the same outlet for its products, clashes are inevitable and in these clashes beaks and claws—armies and navies—must come into play. Hence beaks and claws must be provided beforehand against the day of conflict, and hence the exploitation of white men in Europe and America becomes the reason for the exploitation of black and brown and yellow men in African and Asia. And, therefore, it is hypocritical and absurd to pretend that the capitalist nations can ever intend to abolish wars.… For white folk to insist upon the right to manage their own ancestral lands, free from the domination of tyrants, domestic and foreign, is variously described as “democracy” and “self-determination.” For Negroes, Egyptians and Hindus to seek the same thing is impudence.… Truly has it been said that “the problem of the 20th century is the problem of the ‘Color Line.'” And wars are not likely to end; in fact, they are likely to be wider and more terrible—so long as this theory of white domination seeks to hold down the majority of the world’s people under the iron heel of racial oppression.35

#### 2---distinction without a difference---the line between existential and not ignores converging risks.

Marques 20, professor at the Institute of Philosophy and Human Sciences at the State University of Campinas. (Luiz, 7-3-2020, "Pandemics, Existential and non-Existential Risks to Humanity", *Ambiente & Sociedade*, vol.23, <http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1414-753X2020000100911&amp;tlng=en)---language> edited

2. The concurrence of nine combined regressions

These crises demand undelayable, globally orchestrated political reactions of our societies that are, at the same time, being divided into two evermore hardened and incommunicative groups. On one hand, the state-corporative establishment, determined to maintain the machinery of business as usual at all costs, is advancing its pawns on the international chessboard to guarantee that nothing changes in post-pandemic energy and food systems. On the other, the perception of scientists and growing sectors of society that we have reached a limit beyond which we can no longer advance, given that the harmful effects of globalized capitalism increasingly supersede their benefits. Observation of the concurrence of combined regressions in human security contribute to that perception: (1) after decades of progress in the struggle against food insecurity, the number of people battling acute hunger and suffering from malnutrition has been on the rise over the last four years (FAO, 2019, p. 6). According to the fourth annual Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC, 2020), around 183 million people in 47 countries were classified as being in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) conditions, at risk of slipping into Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) if confronted by an additional shock or stressor. The current pandemic is precisely this additional shock; (2) the six most recent years (2014-2019) and the current one have been the hottest of the last twelve millennia; (3) the globalized food system drove the loss of 3.61 million [square kilometers] km2 of tree cover between 2001 and 2018, according to Global Forest Watch; (4) the heavily subsidized industrial fishing system is now sacrificing the oceans’ future (PAULY, 2019); (5) the catastrophic decline in biodiversity is annihilating vertebrate populations (Living PIanet Index, 2018) and may lead to the extinction of one million species over the next few decades (IPBES, 2019); (6) acidification and eutrophication of the oceans and of various bodies of fresh water is creating marine dead zones and threatening ruptures of trophic chains in the aquatic environment; (7) industrial pollution poisons, sickens, and kills tens of millions of people worldwide each year (WHO Report on Cancer, 2020, for instance); (8) growing geopolitical tensions are seen, with the intensification of endemic conflicts focused on water and energy resources and the anguishing resumption of the nuclear arms race. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) estimates that the nine nuclear armed countries spent US$ 72.9 billion (US$ 35.4 billion was spent by the U.S. alone) on their 13,000+ nuclear weapons in 2019, an increase of US$ 7.1 billion compared to 2018 (ICAN, 2019); (9) democracy and tolerance are increasingly threatened by waves of more or less orchestrated fake and hate news, by flareups of fascism, irrationality, and physical and psychic violence.

Source: Organized by the authors based on EMPLASA (2019) data.

3. Existential and non-existential risks

These crises are interlinked and act in synergy, that is, they reciprocally strengthen one another. And precisely because they are interdependent and reciprocally strengthening each other, it is senseless to deal with them separately. It makes no sense, for example, to understand the current pandemic as simply a health emergency, isolated from other ongoing crises. Most of all, we should not classify these crises in an hierarchical order according to the greater or lesser risk they represent for humanity, as proposed by the University of Cambridge’s Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, or by Toby Ord, from the University of Oxford’s Future of Humanity Institute, in his recent book, The Precipice. Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity (2020).

The considerations proposed by these centers and researchers are very momentous. But they start from the false premise of dividing the risks to which humanity and other species are increasingly exposed into existential and non-existential ones. That dividing line does not exist. An existential risk is, frequently, made from a conjunction of crises that, separately, do not existentially threaten humanity but that, together, have the potential to do so. Will Steffen and colleagues (2018), for example, explored the possibility that “a 2°C warming could activate important tipping elements, raising the temperature further to activate other tipping elements in a domino-like cascade that could take the Earth System to even higher temperatures”. That domino effect can lead us to what the authors called a Hothouse Earth, that is, a largely uninhabitable planet. And, once again, there is no clear dividing line between a planet that is largely uninhabitable and one that is completely uninhabitable for humans and innumerous other species. A chapter written for the English edition of my book, Capitalism and Environmental Collapse (2020), titled “Climate Feedbacks and Tipping Points”, shows how devoid of meaning we find the question, frequently debated in the scientific community and taken up again by Toby Ord, of the probabilities of a warming capable of generating what is called runaway climate change. Let us remember what is truly at stake here for the destiny of humanity. The runaway global warming conjecture, feared by a growing number of scientists (but still rejected by the IPCC3), would be able to lead the Earth toward conditions that prevail today on Venus. This conjecture may be interesting from a strictly scientific point of view, but it is totally useless from the point of view of the fate of animals and forests, because both would cease to exist under conditions that are much less extreme. Yangyang Xu and Veerabhadran Ramanathan (2017) have thus categorized the risks implicated at three levels of global warming: “>1.5°C as dangerous; >3°C as catastrophic; and >5°C as unknown, implying beyond catastrophic, including existential threats”. As established by a host of the next-generation climate models, a global warming of 5°C or even more above the pre-industrial period can be reached by 2100, because “even if coal use doesn’t rise in a catastrophic way, 5°C of warming could occur by other means, including thawing permafrost” (TOLLEFSON, 2020, p. 446).

#### 3---imperialist ethics---putting extinction first sacrifices billions in the Global South at the altar of existential risk.

Torres 21, PhD candidate at Leibniz Universität Hannover. (Phil, July 28th, “The Dangerous Ideas of ‘Longtermism’ and ‘Existential Risk’,” *Current Affairs*, <https://www.currentaffairs.org/2021/07/the-dangerous-ideas-of-longtermism-and-existential-risk>, Accessed 10-27-2021)

It’s this line of reasoning that leads Bostrom, Greaves, MacAskill, and others to argue that even the tiniest reductions in “existential risk” are morally equivalent to saving the lives of literally billions of living, breathing, actual people. For example, Bostrom writes that if there is “a mere 1 percent chance” that 10^54 conscious beings (most living in computer simulations) come to exist in the future, then “we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives.” Greaves and MacAskill echo this idea in a 2021 paper by arguing that “even if there are ‘only’ 1014 lives to come … , a reduction in near-term risk of extinction by one millionth of one percentage point would be equivalent in value to a million lives saved.”

To make this concrete, imagine Greaves and MacAskill in front of two buttons. If pushed, the first would save the lives of 1 million living, breathing, actual people. The second would increase the probability that 10^14 currently unborn people come into existence in the far future by a teeny-tiny amount. Because, on their longtermist view, there is no fundamental moral difference between saving actual people and bringing new people into existence, these options are morally equivalent. In other words, they’d have to flip a coin to decide which button to push. (Would you? I certainly hope not.) In Bostrom’s example, the morally right thing is obviously to sacrifice billions of living human beings for the sake of even tinier reductions in existential risk, assuming a minuscule 1 percent chance of a larger future population: 1054 people.

All of this is to say that even if billions of people were to perish in the coming climate catastrophe, so long as humanity survives with enough of civilization intact to fulfill its supposed “potential,” we shouldn’t be too concerned. In the grand scheme of things, non-runaway climate change will prove to be nothing more than a “mere ripple” —a “small misstep for mankind,” however terrible a “massacre for man” it might otherwise be.

Even worse, since our resources for reducing existential risk are finite, Bostrom argues that we must not “fritter [them] away” on what he describes as “feel-good projects of suboptimal efficacy.” Such projects would include, on this account, not just saving people in the Global South—those most vulnerable, especially women—from the calamities of climate change, but all other non-existential philanthropic causes, too. As the Princeton philosopher Peter Singer writes about Bostrom in his 2015 book on Effective Altruism, “to refer to donating to help the global poor … as a ‘feel-good project’ on which resources are ‘frittered away’ is harsh language.” But it makes perfectly good sense within Bostrom’s longtermist framework, according to which “priority number one, two, three, and four should … be to reduce existential risk.” Everything else is smaller fish not worth frying.

If this sounds appalling, it’s because it is appalling. By reducing morality to an abstract numbers game, and by declaring that what’s most important is fulfilling “our potential” by becoming simulated posthumans among the stars, longtermists not only trivialize past atrocities like WWII (and the Holocaust) but give themselves a “moral excuse” to dismiss or minimize comparable atrocities in the future. This is one reason that I’ve come to see longtermism as an immensely dangerous ideology. It is, indeed, akin to a secular religion built around the worship of “future value,” complete with its own “secularised doctrine of salvation,” as the Future of Humanity Institute historian Thomas Moynihan approvingly writes in his book X-Risk. The popularity of this religion among wealthy people in the West—especially the socioeconomic elite—makes sense because it tells them exactly what they want to hear: not only are you ethically excused from worrying too much about sub-existential threats like non-runaway climate change and global poverty, but you are actually a morally better person for focusing instead on more important things—risk that could permanently destroy “our potential” as a species of Earth-originating intelligent life.

#### 1AC Dowd says:

Finally, the civilized world could bring about peace simply by not resisting the enemies of civilization—by not blunting the Islamic State’s blitzkrieg of Iraq; by not defending the 38th Parallel; by not standing up to Beijing’s land-grab in the South China Sea or Moscow’s bullying of the Baltics or al-Qaeda’s death creed; by not having armies or, for that matter, police. As Reagan said, “There’s only one guaranteed way you can have peace—and you can have it in the next second—surrender.”[x]

#### 1AC Goldman says:

the U.S. healthcare system is laden with fat and overpays for care, much of which is unnecessary

## ADV 2

#### Prices are declining, and generics are strong

Lutter 21, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute. (Randall, 5-24-2021, "Drug prices are declining amid inflation fears", *The Hill*, <https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/554624-drug-prices-are-declining-amidst-inflation-fears>)

Inconveniently, prescription drug prices, in fact, have been falling. BLS data indicate consumer prices for prescription drugs in pharmacies and drug stores fell 1.8 percent in the 12 months ending April 2020, and this April were 3.1 percent below a peak in December 2019. Importantly, drug prices currently are similar to those of summer 2017, indicating negligible drug price inflation over close to four years.

That average drug prices have been flat does not mean, of course, that prices for all drugs are unchanged — only that increases in some drug prices are offset by declines in others. Drug prices fall as patented drugs available from only one firm face competition from generic drugs. More generic competition is associated with lower drug prices, an insight that motivated the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) drug competition action plan, as well as a related biosimilars action plan.

People who depend on drugs to treat chronic conditions are unhappy when prices of the drugs they need increase, and prices for some old drug treatments indeed have risen without apparent increases in the costs of manufacturing or raw materials. Prices of insulin, for customers paying cash, rose between 2014 and 2019, posing grave concerns for such insulin-dependent patients. But the case of insulin is complicated by newer, more convenient formulations and dispensers, and activities of middlemen — pharmacy benefit managers — as well as insulin manufacturers, and last year provoked FDA action that may promote competition.

Legislative proposals, especially bills introduced by Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) and some of his colleagues, do not focus on problems in specific poorly performing drug markets and are very broad in scope. One bill would set limits for prices of drugs deemed “excessive” relative to foreign prices; another would have the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) seek lower drug prices for Medicare through negotiations with drug producers, with a “fallback” of median prices paid in some other countries.

These proposals would overturn a largely successful drug policy paradigm in place since 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act. That paradigm — conceived by former Republican Sen. Orrin Hatch of Utah and former Democratic Rep. Henry Waxman of California — sought both a healthy flow of new drugs and competitive markets for older drugs after the expiration of patent protections and government guarantees of exclusive markets.

This paradigm has worked. First, generic drugs are quite inexpensive in the United States. A recent study by the Rand Corporation, sponsored by HHS, indicates that unbranded generic drug prices in the U.S. are less than 70 percent of generic prices in countries such as Canada, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Unbranded generic drugs represent 84 percent of the total volume of drugs sold in the U.S. (and generics generally account for nine of 10 prescriptions filled), but only 35 percent of the volume sold in other developed countries. Second, U.S. patients have access to more new drugs than patients in other countries. In 2019, 59 percent of new active substances, a subset of truly novel drugs, were first marketed in the U.S. and no other country came close.

#### If overall spending is increasing, that’s the result of higher utilization, not costs

Fein 21, PhD, CEO of Drug Channels Institute. (Adam J., 1-5-2021, "Surprise! Brand-Name Drug Prices Fell (Again) in 2020", *Drug Channels*, <https://www.drugchannels.net/2021/01/surprise-brand-name-drug-prices-fell.html>)

Consequently, higher utilization—not net drug costs—will remain the biggest factor driving overall drug spending growth. Utilization is a positive trend, because it means that more people have access to—and are remaining adherent to—the drug therapy their physician has prescribed. No other part of the healthcare system has seen its average prices drop year after year. In his excellent book The Great American Drug Deal, Peter Kolchinsky made an astute observation: “Doctors and hospitals do not go generic. Surgery will only climb in price. For all the outrage over companies raising the prices of their branded drugs year after year, this is the norm for land values, housing costs, and the prices of many other products.” The latest data show that the situation is even worse than Peter described. Brand-name drug prices continue to decline while the prices of other healthcare products and services continue to rise. Politicians, journalists, and academics who focus on list prices distort the truth about drug prices.

#### Hospitals and clinics are far more important

Barlas 19, journalist citing Chris Pope, PhD, MA, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute. (Stephen, May 2019, "Are Hospital Prices a Bigger Problem than Drug Prices? Congress Doesn’t Know, Doesn’t Care", *PT*, 44(5), <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6487976/>)

Pharmaceutical-company pricing practices have been the national front-page health care irritant for the past few years. The Trump administration and Congress are competing to throw solutions at the perceived problem of high drug prices. But high hospital prices, which may be a bigger problem for consumers? Not a peep. The winter 2019 issue of National Affairs carried a story, which created nary a ripple, entitled The Cost of Hospital Protectionism, by Chris Pope. Pope writes: “Over decades, the structure of state regulations and federal subsidies has encouraged hospitals to inflate their costs by protecting them from competition.”

Jumping into the topic after Pope’s article, the Cost-of-Health-Care News site published a detailed post in February: Where are Health Costs Rising Most? Hospitals. And Here is Why. It starts out with these statistics:

Total U.S. hospital spending in 2017 reached $1.1 trillion, compared with $333 billion for prescription drugs, according to a new study by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).

For the year ending December 31, 2017, hospital costs rose 4.6%, compared with a 0.4% rise in drug costs, again according to CMS. For the previous year, hospital costs rose 5.6%, or more than two-and-a-half times the rate of inflation. Drug costs in 2016 rose 2.3%. Hospital spending increases

are outstripping drug increases again in 2018.

Overall, hospitals represent 33% of U.S. health care costs; physician and clinical spending, 20%; and drugs, 10%.

The writer goes on to wonder: “One of the great mysteries in recent years is why pharmaceutical companies are portrayed as the villains in the story of rising U.S. health care costs while hospitals are virtually ignored.” During the first few months of the 116th Congress, both House and Senate committees have been rolling out hearings on prescription drug prices in rote, assembly-line fashion, sometimes on the same day. The House Ways and Means, Judiciary, Oversight, and Energy and Commerce committees have all been competing for the limelight on an issue that is not particularly well understood by members of Congress given the generally stable prices of most drugs, with the exception of a small percentage of biologicals, specialty pharmaceuticals, and sole-source generics.

# 1NR

## DA---HORSETRADING

#### No moral order is possible while racism is tolerated—ethics are meaningless without a prior rejection of it

**Memmi 2K** (Albert, Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ U of Paris, Naiteire, Racism, Translated by Steve Martinot, p. 163-165)

The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved. Yet, for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism; one must not even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people, which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. it is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which man is not himself an outsider relative to someone else?. Racism illustrates, in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated that is, it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animosity to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduit only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order, for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism, because racism signifies the exclusion of the other, and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is ‘the truly capital sin. It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsels respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. Bur no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall.” says the Bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming one again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal—indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality because, in the end, **the ethical choice commands the political choice**, a just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.

#### GOP will block antitrust reform now

Rodrigo 5-5-2021 (Chris Mills, Republicans float support for antitrust reform after Trump Facebook ban upheld, The Hill, <https://thehill.com/policy/technology/551984-republicans-float-support-for-antitrust-reform-after-trump-facebook-ban>)

While some Republicans — most prominently Sen. Josh Hawley (Mo.) or Rep. Ken Buck (Colo.) – have backed antitrust investigations into the U.S.'s largest technology companies and pushed to give enforcement teeth, the larger GOP has been hesitant to back reforms. On the other side of the aisle, Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.) introduced an omnibus antitrust package earlier this year aimed at strengthening competition laws and revamping antitrust enforcement. And Rep. David Cicilline (D-R.I.) is set to introduce several smaller bills this year based on his House Judiciary antitrust subcommittee’s investigation into competition in digital marketplaces. Republicans have not introduced stand-alone antitrust bills this year, but Buck did provide an outline of the party’s position in a report responding to the bipartisan Judiciary investigation. Scalise's and Jordan’s offices did not respond to inquiries about what kind of antitrust proposals they would support. Banks told The Hill that he is “broadly supportive” of Buck’s report. Cowboys for Trump founder offered plea deal in Jan. 6 case Hillicon Valley: Cryptocurrency amendment blocked in Senate | Dems... That document backed Democratic proposals to allocate resources to antitrust regulators and reform the burden of proof for merger cases, but cautioned that more aggressive suggestions like presumptively freezing acquisitions for major companies or enforcing structural separation were non-starters for Republicans. “Current antitrust law needs to be amended to better handle competition in digital markets, antitrust agencies should be beefed up and they need to regulate mergers and acquisitions more strictly,” Banks added in a statement. Republican support will be needed for any of the existing or forthcoming antitrust proposals to make it past the Senate to President Biden’s desk.

#### Deplatforming is working now at countering misinformation---but permanence is key

Starbird 21, PhD, Professor @ U Washington (Kate, being interviewed by Cornish, “Is Deplatforming Enough To Fight Disinformation And Extremism?,” NPR, <https://www.npr.org/2021/01/25/960466075/is-deplatforming-enough-to-fight-disinformation-and-extremism>)

When Donald Trump was still in office and had a working Twitter account, just one tweet could change an entire news cycle. People who research disinformation, like Kate Starbird, know this all too well. KATE STARBIRD: My advisor, Leysia Palen, at the University of Washington, was watching content about COVID-19 and just following the CDC account, just trying to, like, understand what the CDC account was going to do. And one day, Donald Trump retweeted three or four tweets from the CDC, and it literally broke her data collection. CORNISH: After the U.S. Capitol riot, Twitter permanently suspended Trump for inciting violence. He's also currently off Facebook and YouTube and many other social media services. This is called deplatforming. Experts say deplatforming can be an important first step in cutting off the oxygen to disinformation and violence, which seemed to be confirmed when a company called Zignal Labs announced a 73% drop in misinformation after Trump had been deplatformed. We asked University of Washington professor Kate Starbird about that study. STARBIRD: I think we just need to add some context to that. And I think if you look at the original reporting from The Washington Post, some of that context was there. What Zignal Labs did was they took a measure of misinformation that was essentially just looking at keywords related to claims of election fraud. And they looked at one week compared to the week before. And a couple of things happened that were different from one week to the next. And that - the suspension of Donald Trump's account probably made a difference, but it's hard to attribute all of that difference to just that one suspension because 70,000 other accounts were taken out of the system. CORNISH: People were looking at this, I think, because there's this question about whether deplatforming actually works as a tactic to mitigate disinformation. Do you have a sense that it can have long-term impact? STARBIRD: I have a sense that it'll have short-term impact for sure. What happens in the long term, I think, is something we don't yet know the answer to. My expectation will be that if those suspensions stay in place and if that vacuum isn't filled by others spreading misinformation and if the platforms can do a better job of not letting those networks build themselves back in, that there will be a long-term benefit to the platforms that did the deplatforming.

#### The success in deplatforming Trump sets a precedent for future expansion of content moderation

McGregor 21, PhD, assistant professor at the Hussman School of Journalism and Media, and a senior researcher with the Center for Information, Technology, and Public Life, both at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. (Shannon, “Does Deplatforming Trump Set a New Precedent for Content Moderation?,” *CIG Online*, <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/does-deplatforming-trump-set-new-precedent-content-moderation/>)

The violent insurrection incited at least in part by Trump’s rhetoric in tweets and posts was sadly a long-overdue wake-up call for social media platforms. Researchers and journalists examining far-right extremists and mis- and disinformation have been sounding the alarm for years. Many of Trump’s previous posts violated social media platforms’ own content moderation policies, but were mostly given a pass because he was the president. What last week’s event showed is that enforcing policies aimed at supporting democracy must especially be enforced against those with great power and influence like the president. Context and timing matter as well. After years of hedging (given Trump’s repeated violations of various platforms’ policies) the platforms’ actions now — only after white lives were threatened and lost, and with mere days left in his presidency — can charitably be viewed with a heap of cynicism. All that being said, the decision to deplatform was right, for this terribly dangerous moment. At the same time, it sets a terribly dangerous precedent.

#### De-platforming is a key challenge to anti-black violence

Devich-Cyril 21, activist, a writer, and a public speaker on the issues of digital rights, narrative power, Black liberation, and collective grief. Devich-Cyril is also a Senior Fellow at MediaJustice and the organization’s founding executive director (Malkia, “Banning White Supremacy Isn’t Censorship, It’s Accountability,” Wired, <https://www.wired.com/story/banning-white-supremacy-censorship-accountability/>)

EARLIER THIS MONTH, in the wake of the fatal incursion of an angry, mostly white and male mob into the Capitol Building in Washington, DC, Facebook and Twitter blocked Donald Trump’s accounts. YouTube followed with a temporary ban, which it has continued to extend in the weeks since. According to these platforms, Trump’s dangerous pattern of behavior violated their content management rules. Shortly after, Amazon Web Services ended its hosting support for the neo-Nazi online haven Parler. Parler countered with a lawsuit alleging that Amazon’s decision was an antitrust violation motivated by political animus, which the courts readily rejected. In the coming days, Facebook’s Oversight Board is expected to issue a final decision on whether to allow the former president back on its platform. The collective sigh of relief that rippled through the digital spaces occupied by Black, indigenous and other people of color following the wave of deplatformings was visceral, and the impact was almost immediate. A study conducted by research firm Zignal Labs found that online disinformation, particularly about election fraud, fell by an incredible 73 percent in the week after Twitter’s suspension of Trump’s social media account. Online forums for Trump supporters are now fractured and weakened. But many reacted to the social media bans with outrage. First Amendment fundamentalists across the political spectrum raised “free speech” concerns, claiming that the social media bans were a slippery slope. Though they’re being used to hold the powerful to account today, the argument goes, they could be used to repress minority groups in the future. Others worried that a digital oligarchy of big tech companies like Facebook, Twitter, Google, Apple, and Amazon with the unchecked power to silence individuals represents a threat to democracy. I share the concern about the outsize influence of big tech on governance and the economy. But, as a Black activist who’s been fighting for digital rights and justice and against digital disparities, surveillance, and hate for more than a decade, the reaction that most resonated was relief and a sense of collective triumph. Finally, after years of organizing, movements for racial justice and human rights were able to hold these companies accountable to the demand that they give no platform or profit to white supremacy—at least momentarily. That it took so long and such extreme circumstances for the platforms to take action, despite years of warnings and complaints, is nothing short of enraging. But it’s also not terribly surprising, especially when you consider the unequal distribution of First Amendment rights on the internet. For the past decade, we have witnessed the resurgence of white supremacy in mainstream political and public debate, and it’s only been enabled by media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. While those already in power may rely on the Constitution and the democratizing promise of the open internet, Black people and other marginalized groups need more than the intent of the law to enjoy its equal protection. This is not about the inherent objective of the First Amendment as law, or even about its shifting interpretations by courts over time—it is about the impact that white supremacy, anti-Black violence, and other forms of racial terrorism abetted by so-called free speech have on the speech and freedoms of Black and brown Americans.

#### Makes social media a safe space for challenging systemic racism

Devich-Cyril 21, activist, a writer, and a public speaker on the issues of digital rights, narrative power, Black liberation, and collective grief. Devich-Cyril is also a Senior Fellow at MediaJustice and the organization’s founding executive director (Malkia, “Banning White Supremacy Isn’t Censorship, It’s Accountability,” Wired, https://www.wired.com/story/banning-white-supremacy-censorship-accountability/)

Even hate speech bans that protect targeted groups aren’t enough. To advance equal representation and application of the First Amendment, tech companies should turn to the brilliance of civil rights and liberties advocates. They have plenty of ideas. The Electronic Frontier Foundation recommends that companies adopt the Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability in Content Moderation as a baseline starting point, to provide “meaningful due process to impacted speakers and better ensure that the enforcement of their content guidelines is fair, unbiased, proportional, and respectful of users’ rights.” Steven Renderos, the executive director at MediaJustice, and Brandi Collins-Dexter, a visiting fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Shorenstein Center on Media and the Politics and Public Policy and senior fellow at Color of Change, both recommend that tech companies overhaul their algorithms to reward those that fight hate rather than those that promote it. These and other groups in the Change the Terms Coalition have worked tirelessly alongside Black and Latino activists to curb the use of social media, payment processors, event-scheduling pages, chat rooms, and other applications for hateful activities. Deplatforming white supremacy, chauvinism, and fascism is not antithetical to this battle for free speech, but a continuation. When big tech allows white hate speech to go unfettered, it not only bolsters white supremacist violence but echoes real world racial inequities that privilege white communities and depress Black wealth, mortality, and quality of life. As we’ve seen, when white nationalist speech and racist conditions comingle, they operate together and become part of the status quo, adopted by some government officials, law enforcement, members of the military and more. In a nation fractured by white supremacy and other forms of inequality, democracy is called to double duty—it must distribute political freedoms like those offered in the First Amendment while simultaneously ensuring civil rights which extend equal protection to all. This is no easy task, especially in the age of algorithmic decisionmaking, digital economies, and loosely regulated and vastly profitable media platforms. For too long, the debate about free speech rights has been coopted by right-wing racial extremism and white liberal elitism. But, for Black, indigenous and other communities of color, power is as consequential as rights. If social movements for racial justice, technology companies, and elected officials were able to carve out a sweet spot where Black activists had the power to use the internet to speak freely about anti-racism without having our speech suppressed by both algorithmic bias and organized hate; if we could assemble to oppose police violence without the threat of violent reprisal at every turn; if we could employ a press to contest for power without being criminalized and excluded—then we as a nation can claim the First Amendment is inherent to the democracy we want, and the future of freedom we demand.

#### Prohibitions on censorship turn the case---lead to mass corporate monopolization and anti-democratic exclusion

Desikan 7-22-2021, political director at the Action Center on Race & the Economy (ACRE). Vasudha comes from a long history of campaigning in the labor movement, mostly with low-wage workers at SEIU. Most recently, Vasudha was the policy director at United for Respect, where she worked with progressive electeds to amplify the voices and leadership of retail workers at Amazon, Walmart, and private-equity owned retail companies. She holds an M.A. in International Relations from American University. (Vasudha, “Republicans Are Using Antitrust Reform as a Trojan Horse to Attack Democracy,” Truthout, <https://truthout.org/articles/republicans-are-using-antitrust-reform-as-a-trojan-horse-to-attack-democracy/>)

Over the past year, we have seen a tidal wave of support to address and rein in monopolies like we haven’t seen in decades. As companies like Amazon and Facebook have demonstrated the dangers of having too much power concentrated in one company — and as corporate consolidation has upended entire sectors of our economy, from farms to pharmacies — regulators and elected officials have taken unheard-of new steps to stop the spread of unchecked corporate power. These past few weeks, the Biden administration and Congress have signaled strong support for greater antitrust action: the appointment of Google critic Jonathan Kanter to lead the Department of Justice’s antitrust division, the advancement of leading anti-monopoly scholar Lina Khan’s nomination to the Federal Trade Commission, a slate of House bills targeting Big Tech’s corporate power, and a strong executive order on competition from the Biden administration. But as antitrust reforms have grown in popularity, they have found an unlikely set of backers: far right politicians like Senators Ted Cruz, Tom Cotton and Josh Hawley who, just months ago, openly supported a white nationalist insurrection and have voted time and again to cut taxes for corporations. Some might be tempted to welcome their support — a sign, perhaps, of newfound bipartisanship under the Biden administration. It is a temptation we must resist at all costs. Supporters like these won’t make it easier to win meaningful antitrust reforms that help us build a functional, multiracial democracy. By framing the antitrust fight as solely an economic populist one, they will doom the project altogether and could pave the way for a dangerous alliance between big business and government that will ease the path to power for white nationalists. To understand why, we need to understand the history of anti-monopoly policy making. The Incompatibility of Monopolies and Democracies In the late 19th and early 20th century, a handful of megacorporations like Standard Oil and U.S. Steel rose to dominance, growing powerful enough to dictate terms to lawmakers. Their rise was accompanied by the erosion of worker and consumer protections, ruthless tactics to wipe out competitors and, unsurprisingly, massive economic and racial inequality. In the early 1900s, fascist state power was propped up by corporate monopolies. Starting in the early 1900s, lawmakers increasingly began to push back and through a series of new laws and court decisions, broke up monopolies and placed some limits on their power. In Europe, by contrast, powerful monopolies were put into power and then co-governed with genocidal dictators in Germany, Spain and Italy. Fascist state power was propped up by corporate monopolies. While the antitrust reforms of the early 20th century and a militant labor movement helped stave off corporate consolidation and unchecked power, in the 1970s, a bipartisan pro-business effort came together to eliminate guardrails that had prevented businesses from gaining too much power. It’s no surprise that decades later, monopoly powers are on the march again — and neoliberalism is bringing to power leaders with fascist tendencies like Donald Trump. Tim Wu, who is Biden’s special adviser on competition policy, noted these contrasts in the opening of his book, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age: “Extreme economic concentration yields gross inequality and material suffering, feeding an appetite for nationalistic and extremist leadership.” It would be naive to think that somehow, in the wake of Trump’s defeat, that democracy is safe and we can repair the harms done to our multiracial society. What is clear is that there is a rising strain among certain Republicans who are Trump’s strongest supporters and have taken up the populist mantle of antitrust — as though they hadn’t been corporate America’s allies in Congress for years. We should not be fooled. When Senator Hawley and Senator Cruz call for breaking up corporate power, they are co-opting antitrust language to both punish “woke corporations” taking anti-racist stances, and to build up their base — especially people and communities facing unemployment, wage stagnation and disinvestment. They are not true believers in multiracial democracy — antitrust is merely a tool for them to play out a personal agenda against perceived tech bias against conservatives. I’ve seen this strategy in action myself. Growing up in India in the early 1990s, I was witness to the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Hindu nationalist party that rules the country today. The party fused an economic program of national self-sufficiency and economic populism with Hindu nationalism and ruthless attacks on Muslims. As a child, my friends and I canvassed for the BJP, having been recruited by a neighbor with a few rupees and some candy. The election propaganda we distributed lured regular people in with the promises of a more prosperous future — what they left out was that their reforms were designed only for upper-caste Hindus in clear rejection of a secular democracy. I didn’t understand that the result could only be the violent social, economic and political exclusion we see in India now. This is the future that awaits us if we buy Hawley and Cruz’s snake-oil promises and normalize their economic policy platforms. Our dream of building a multiracial democracy will be destroyed as fascists and monopolists consolidate power.

## ADV 1

#### Their 1AC is an act of discursive violence that should be rejected

Schetter 21, Research Fellow at the Center for Development Research (ZEF) of the University of Bonn. (Conrad, Frontiers’ violence: The interplay of state of exception, frontier habitus, and organized violence, Political Geography Vol 87, May 2021, [https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629821000305#](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629821000305)!)

In addition, social orders are based on practices of inclusion and exclusion, which entail social inequalities such as economic stratifications, exclusion from political participation, and gender-or ethnic-based discrimination (Bierstedt, 1974; Wrong, 1994). If such inequalities harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs, they can be called “structural violence” (Galtung, 1969) or “systemic violence” (Žižek, 2008). Marginalization, however, is not only produced by material disadvantages, but also by discursive violence, which embraces overlapping concepts such as “epistemic violence” (Spivak 1988), “cultural violence” (Galtung, 1990; Vorobej, 2016), “normative violence” (Butler, 1990), or “symbolic violence” (Bourdieu, 1977). Violence manifests itself in language, habits, norms, and social representation. Such conceptualizations, although they are contested due to their fuzziness, hint to the very fact that social inequalities are congealed as non-material and unintentional forms of violence in societal institutions. They lead to a reduction of self -fulfillment, as they are used to maintain social stratification, to control access, and to exclude certain social segments (Schinkel, 2010). Structural and discursive violence do not necessarily depend on physical force and the threat of violent death or bodily harm. In practice, however, organized violence and social inequalities are often closely intertwined. The former is, arguably, needed in order to uphold and reproduce the latter, whereas structural, as well as discursive forms of violence, prepare the ground for the use and legitimacy of direct violence by cultural othering or oppressing subaltern voices (Imbusch, 2003). However, structural and discursive violence open such extreme, wide interpretations that they entail the danger of relativizing the meaning of violence. Accordingly we subscribe to the succinct definition of Malešević. For him, violence embraces “ …. intentional and unintentional actions [which] generate some substantial coercively imposed behavioural changes or produce physical, mental or emotional damage, injury or death” (Malešević, 2017: 15).

#### Their construction of Mexico as a site overrun by criminal drug cartels is a discourse of domination that entrenches racism

Weissman 15, Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. (Reef, The Politics of Narrative: Law and the Representation of Mexican Criminality Deborah Weissman University of North Carolina School of Law, FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:141}

Accounts of Mexico have become familiar and formulaic. Any totalizing characterization that serves to flatten the Mexican landscape is not only inaccurate, but suggests a type of “Mexicobashing” that finds sustenance into the dark interior of American nativism and xenophobia. Reports of the threat posed by drug-related violence to national security, fear for public safety posed by Mexican migration, and the depiction of the country as a pathway for human trafficking have assumed distorted proportions.6 Certainly, the death toll, fear, and suffering have sharply risen since the Mexican government militarized its response to drug cartel violence.7 As a matter of geography, the tens of thousands of Central Americans fleeing gang-related violence born of failed drug-war policies, trade agreements, and corruption, travel the same corridors that traffickers often use to supply the drugs to meet an almost insatiable demand in the United States. In fact, the crime rate in most of Mexico is unexceptional and the overall murder rate is lower than other countries in the region, and similar to the United States.8 Moreover, the crime rate generally throughout the country has declined.9 Mindful of the consequences of the distortions and the misinformation that leads to the misrepresentation of a people, Mexican civil rights groups have attempted to provide a more nuanced view of conditions in Mexico.10 Paradoxically, US officials repeatedly state that the border is presently as secure as it has ever been.11 FBI reports and recent data indicate that accounts of “spillover violence” are unfounded.12 The United States describes the Mexican government as cooperative and working to “‘prioritize the safe and humane treatment of individuals’” who are deported to Mexico.13 This is not to minimize the violence that has cost Mexicans dearly. Rather, the seriousness of the situation requires an analysis of the drug-related violence that goes beyond the sensationalist descriptions which may chronicle the current turmoil but reveals little about the political and socio-economic circumstances that give rise to the conditions of a drug war and to the “Mexican-as-criminal” narrative that pervades social relations and legal constructions in the United States.14 The construct of the Mexican as a menace is not new. It is possessed of a proper history with origins in the nineteenth century.15 Mexicans have been described as “‘earless and heartless creatures,’ ‘semi-barbarians,’ who were ‘only interested in satisfying their animal wants’”16 and as “uneducated and grossly ignorant, highly excitable, and given to spasmodic outbursts of passion, outlawry and violence.”17 They have been lynched for being “‘too Mexican,’” and harassed for speaking their native language or otherwise expressing their culture.18 They have long been considered the “prototypical illegal alien.”19 The discourse has served to rationalize social and legal policies and practices of exclusion. However, it is important to note that the master narrative of Mexican criminality has also been adopted by well-meaning legal advocates who have availed themselves of the drug violence narrative for humanitarian purposes and deployed to enhance an immigrant’s chance of remaining lawfully in the United States through various forms of immigration relief.20 Still others have used the specter of drug cartel violence to advocate for reformed, humane drug laws throughout the hemisphere.21 New narratives about Mexico have recently emerged, however tentatively, that warrant examination: the Obama administration has recast Mexico as a strong and vibrant economic partner to the United States. Business groups and their supporters in Congress have once again extolled the virtues of the laboring Mexican worker and government officials acting on behalf of US oil interests praise Mexico’s “ambitious reforms to make [the Mexican] economy more competitive.”22 Recent scholarship, also, has offered a more balanced description of the skill level and expertise that Mexican workers bring to the US workplace, countering the dominant narrative of the “criminal alien” and debunking the myth of the ubiquitous unskilled Mexican worker. New research serves to document the constructive transformation Mexican workers have accomplished in the labor market for all workers and the benefits that Mexican entrepreneurship brings to local communities.23 Insofar as narratives are formed as socially-constructed and culturally-contingent artifacts, they provide insight into a larger “truths” about US-Mexico relations. Narratives are not only an expression of social attitudes and nativist sentiments. They also develop in tandem with and within the law and legal discourse. They are both cause and consequence of a public mood. This Article seeks to contribute to the scholarship that has examined the way that Latin Americans in general and Mexicans in particular have been subordinated through narratives in ways that bear on public policy, national interest, and law. It demonstrates that the discourse has implications that extend beyond US borders into Mexico while reaching deep into local neighborhoods and towns in the United States. It then considers whether alternative uses of the narratives and newly emerging characterizations are sufficiently disruptive of dominant discursive devices used to subordinate Mexicans.24 Part I examines the construction of the prevailing political narrative of the Mexican-as-criminal at the transnational, national, and local level. It considers how the discursive uses of such stereotypes act to construct law that is, in turn, constitutive of the narrative. At the transnational, national, and state and local level, legal developments respond to and reinforce the construction of the Mexican as super-predator with dire consequences for communities on both sides of the border. At the transnational level, Mexicans perceived to be a danger to the United States are inscribed into the larger national angst of terrorism to which transnational policing in the form of a military response is deemed necessary. At the national level, the depiction of the criminal Mexican immigrant contributes to xenophobic excesses and is exploited as political scapegoating and often serves to divert attention away from the material reality of the political economic circumstances of migration that might otherwise inform immigration reform.25 At the state and local level, particularly in communities with histories of nativist sentiments and racial animus, the depiction of the Mexican criminal in their midst, in their schools, on their roads, and at their worksites, is used to justify policies of exclusion and community stratification.26 Racist tendencies are refueled and reinvigorated as a matter of social practices, particularly in the South.27

#### Dowd relies on racialized constructions of “uncivilized” threats to Western Civilization.

1AC Dowd 15—(senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute Center for America's Purpose). Alan Dowd. 2015. “Shield & Sword: The Case for Military Deterrence”. <https://providencemag.com/2015/12/shield-sword-the-case-for-military-deterrence/>.

Some people of faith oppose the threat of military force, let alone the use of military force, because of Christ’s message of peace. This is understandable in the abstract, but we must keep in mind two truths. First, governments are held to a different standard than individuals, and hence are expected to do certain things individuals aren’t expected to do—and arguably shouldn’t do certain things individuals should do. For example, a government that turned the other cheek when attacked would be conquered by its foes, leaving countless innocents defenseless. A government that put away the sword—that neglected its defenses—would invite aggression, thus jeopardizing its people. Second, all uses of force are not the same. The sheriff who uses force to apprehend a murderer is decidedly different from the criminal who uses force to commit a murder. The policemen posted outside a sporting event to deter violence are decidedly different from those who plot violence. Moral relativism is anything but a virtue. Some lament the fact that we live in such a violent world, but that’s precisely the point. Because we live in a violent world, governments must take steps to deter those who can be deterred—and neutralize those who cannot. In this regard, it pays to recall that Jesus had sterner words for scholars and scribes than He did for soldiers. In fact, when a centurion asked Jesus for help, He didn’t admonish the military commander to put down his sword. Instead, He commended him for his faith.[i] “Even in the Gospels,” soldier-scholar Ralph Peters reminds us, “it is assumed that soldiers are, however regrettably, necessary.”[ii] They are necessary not only for waging war but, preferably, for maintaining peace. It’s a paradoxical truth that military readiness can keep the peace. The Romans had a phrase for it: Si vis pacem, para bellum. “If you wish for peace, prepare for war.” President George Washington put it more genteelly: “There is nothing so likely to produce peace as to be well prepared to meet an enemy.” Or, in the same way, “We infinitely desire peace,” President Theodore Roosevelt declared. “And the surest way of obtaining it is to show that we are not afraid of war.” After the West gambled civilization’s very existence in the 1920s and 1930s on hopes that war could somehow be outlawed, the men who crafted the blueprint for waging the Cold War returned to peace through strength. Winston Churchill proposed “defense through deterrents.” President Harry Truman called NATO “an integrated international force whose object is to maintain peace through strength…we devoutly pray that our present course of action will succeed and maintain peace without war.”[iii] President Dwight Eisenhower explained, “Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk its own destruction.” President John Kennedy vowed to “strengthen our military power to the point where no aggressor will dare attack.” And President Ronald Reagan steered the Cold War to a peaceful end by noting, “None of the four wars in my lifetime came about because we were too strong.” Reagan also argued, “Our military strength is a prerequisite for peace.”[iv] Even so, arms alone aren’t enough to deter war. After all, the great powers were armed to the teeth in 1914. But since they weren’t clear about their intentions and treaty commitments, a small crisis on the fringes of Europe mushroomed into a global war. Neither is clarity alone enough to deter war. After all, President Woodrow Wilson’s admonitions to the Kaiser were clear, but America lacked the military strength at the onset of war to make those words matter and thus deter German aggression. In other words, America was unable to deter. “The purpose of a deterrence force is to create a set of conditions that would cause an adversary to conclude that the cost of any particular act against the United States of America or her allies is far higher than the potential benefit of that act,” explains Gen. Kevin Chilton, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command. It is a “cost-benefit calculus.”[v] So, given the anemic state of America’s military before 1917, the Kaiser calculated that the benefits of attacking U.S. ships and trying to lure Mexico into an alliance outweighed the costs. That proved to be a grave miscalculation. In order for the adversary not to miscalculate, a few factors must hold. First, consequences must be clear, which was not the case on the eve of World War I. Critics of deterrence often cite World War I to argue that arms races trigger wars. But if it were that simple, then a) there wouldn’t have been a World War II, since the Allies allowed their arsenals to atrophy after 1918, and b) there would have been a World War III, since Washington and Moscow engaged in an unprecedented arms race. The reality is that miscalculation lit the fuse of World War I. The antidote, as alluded to above, is strength plus clarity. A second important factor to avoid miscalculation: The adversary must be rational, which means it can grasp and fear consequences. Fear is an essential ingredient of deterrence. It pays to recall that deterrence comes from the Latin dēterreō: “to frighten off.”[vi] Of course, as Churchill conceded, “The deterrent does not cover the case of lunatics.”[vii] Mass-murderers masquerading as holy men and death-wish dictators may be immune from deterrence. (The secondary benefit of the peace-through-strength model is that it equips those who embrace it with the capacity to defeat these sorts of enemies rapidly and return to the status quo ante.) Third, the consequences of military confrontation must be credible and tangible, which was the case during most of the Cold War. Not only did Washington and Moscow construct vast military arsenals to deter one another; they were clear about their treaty commitments and about the consequences of any threat to those commitments. Recall how Eisenhower answered Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s boast about the Red Army’s overwhelming conventional advantage in Germany: “If you attack us in Germany,” the steely American commander-in-chief fired back, “there will be nothing conventional about our response.”[viii] Eisenhower’s words were unambiguously clear, and unlike Wilson, he wielded the military strength to give them credibility. Discussing military deterrence in the context of Christianity may seem incongruent to some readers. But for a pair of reasons it is not. First, deterrence is not system is a form of military readiness. Similarly, I Chronicles 27 provides detail about the Israelites’ just a matter of GDPs and geopolitics. In fact, scripture often uses the language of deterrence and preparedness. For example, in the first chapter of Numbers the Lord directs Moses and Aaron to count “all the men in Israel who are twenty years old or more and able to serve in the army.” This ancient selective-service massive standing army: twelve divisions of 24,000 men each. II Chronicles 17 explains the military preparations made by King Jehoshaphat of Judah, a king highly revered for his piety, who built forts, maintained armories in strategically located cities “with large supplies” and fielded an army of more than a million men “armed for battle.” Not surprisingly, “the fear of the Lord fell on all the kingdoms of the lands surrounding Judah, so that they did not go to war against Jehoshaphat.” In the New Testament, Paul writes in Romans 13 that “Rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong…Rulers do not bear the sword for no reason.” Again, this is the language of deterrence. Those who follow the law within a country and who respect codes of conduct between countries have nothing to fear. Those who don’t have much to fear. Likewise, to explain the importance of calculating the costs of following Him, Jesus asks in Luke 14, “What king would go to war against another king without first sitting down to consider whether his 10,000 soldiers could go up against the 20,000 coming against him? And if he didn’t think he could win, he would send a representative to discuss terms of peace while his enemy was still a long way off.” In a sense, both kings are wise—one because he recognizes that he’s outnumbered; the other because he makes sure that he’s not. Put another way, both kings subscribe to peace through strength. Again, as with the Centurion earlier, Jesus could have rebuked the martial character of these kings, but he did not. This is not just description but commendation. We ignore their example at our peril. Secondly, it is not incongruent if we understand military deterrence as a means to prevent great-power war—the kind that kills by the millions, the kind humanity has not endured for seven decades. We know we will not experience the biblical notion of peace—of shalom, peace with harmony and justice—until Christ returns to make all things new. In the interim, in a broken world, the alternatives to peace through strength leave much to be desired: peace through hope, peace through violence, or peace through submission. But these options are inadequate. The sheer destructiveness and totality of great-power war testify that crossing our fingers and hoping for peace is not a Christian option. Wishful thinking, romanticizing reality, is the surest way to invite what Churchill called “temptations to a trial of strength.” Moreover, the likelihood that the next great-power war would involve multiple nuclear-weapons states means that it could end civilization. Therefore, a posture that leaves peer adversaries doubting the West’s capabilities and resolve—thus inviting miscalculation—is not only unsound, but immoral and inhumane—unchristian. “Deterrence of war is more humanitarian than anything,” Gen. Park Yong Ok, a longtime South Korean military official, argues. “If we fail to deter war, a tremendous number of civilians will be killed.”[ix] Peace through violence has been tried throughout history. Pharaoh, Caesar and Genghis Khan, Lenin, Hitler, Stalin and Mao, all attained a kind of peace by employing brutal forms of violence. However, this is not the kind of “peace” under which God’s crowning creation can flourish; neither would the world long tolerate such a scorched-earth “peace.” This option, too, the Christian rejects.

Finally, the civilized world could bring about peace simply by not resisting the enemies of civilization—by not blunting the Islamic State’s blitzkrieg of Iraq; by not defending the 38th Parallel; by not standing up to Beijing’s land-grab in the South China Sea or Moscow’s bullying of the Baltics or al-Qaeda’s death creed; by not having armies or, for that matter, police. As Reagan said, “There’s only one guaranteed way you can have peace—and you can have it in the next second—surrender.”[x]

The world has tried these alternatives to peace through strength, and the outcomes have been disastrous. After World War I, Western powers disarmed and convinced themselves they had waged the war to end all wars. By 1938, as Churchill concluded after Munich, the Allies had been “reduced…from a position of security so overwhelming and so unchallengeable that we never cared to think about it.”[xi] Like predators in the wilderness, the Axis powers sensed weakness and attacked. In October 1945—not three months after the Missouri steamed into Tokyo Bay—Gen. George Marshall decried the “disintegration not only of the Armed Forces, but apparently…all conception of world responsibility,” warily asking, “Are we already, at this early date, inviting that same international disrespect that prevailed before this war?”[xii] Stalin answered Marshall’s question by gobbling up half of Europe, blockading Berlin, and arming Kim Il-Sung in patient preparation for the invasion of South Korea.[xiii] The U.S. military had taken up positions in Korea in 1945, but withdrew all combat forces in 1949.[xiv] Then, in 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that Japan, Alaska and the Philippines fell within America’s “defensive perimeter.”[xv] Korea didn’t. Stalin noticed. Without a U.S. deterrent in place, Stalin gave Kim a green light to invade. Washington then reversed course and rushed American forces back into Korea, and the Korean peninsula plunged into one of the most ferocious wars in history. The cost of miscalculation in Washington and Moscow: 38,000 Americans, 103,250 South Korean troops, 316,000 North Korean troops, 422,000 Chinese troops and 2 million civilian casualties.[xvi] The North Korean tyranny— now under command of Kim’s grandson—still dreams of conquering South Korea. The difference between 2015 and 1950 is that tens of thousands of battle-ready U.S. and ROK troops are stationed on the border. They’ve been there every day since 1953. The lesson of history is that waging war is far more costly than maintaining a military capable of deterring war. As Washington observed, “Timely disbursements to prepare for danger frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it.” Just compare military allocations, as a percentage of GDP, during times of war and times of peace: In the eight years before entering World War I, the United States devoted an average of 0.7 percent of GDP to defense; during the war, U.S. defense spending spiked to 16.1 percent of GDP. In the decade before entering World War II, the United States spent an average of 1.1 percent of GDP on defense; during the war, the U.S. diverted an average of 27 percent of GDP to the military annually. During the Cold War, Washington spent an average of 7 percent of GDP on defense to deter Moscow; it worked. Yet it seems we have forgotten those hard-learned lessons. In his book The World America Made, Robert Kagan explains how “America’s most important role has been to dampen and deter the normal tendencies of other great powers to compete and jostle with one another in ways that historically have led to war.” This role has depended on America’s military might. “There is no better recipe for great-power peace,” Kagan concludes, “than certainty about who holds the upper hand.”[xvii]

#### Listen to how Dowd’s institute decided on its name.

Sagamore Institute ( “Our Story” , <https://sagamoreinstitute.org/about/>)

Why “Sagamore”?

One of Indiana’s Native American tribes coined the term Sagamore to identify the member who grapples with serious questions, helps build consensus, and offers wisdom and advice. This is exactly the type of think tank we wanted to build: a place that leaned into hard problems with sleeves rolled up alongside public and private leaders to dedicated to making the world a better place.

#### Here’s Dowd’s bio on the Sagamore website

Sagamore Institute (ALAN DOWD-Senior Fellow | Center for America's Purpose , https://sagamoreinstitute.org/bio-alan-dowd/

Senior Fellow Alan W. Dowd heads the Center for America’s Purpose (CAP) at Sagamore Institute. CAP was launched in 2014 to promote America’s leadership role in the world through published work and policy speeches. In addition, Dowd manages and authors Sagamore’s Project Fortress blog, which explores the intersection of faith, liberty and security, and he serves as curator of Sagamore’s Pathfinder project, which is a storehouse of the “essentials” for understanding the evolution of U.S. foreign and defense policy. Focusing on U.S. foreign policy, national defense and international security, Dowd’s award-winning writing appears in a number leading publications, including: American Outlook, Military Officer, The American, Claremont Review of Books, American Legion Magazine, American Institute for Economic Research, Institute for Faith, Work and Economics, Policy Review, Journal of Diplomacy & International Relations, Providence, Current, Parameters, Fraser Forum, World Politics Review, Washington Times, Real Clear Defense, Baltimore Sun, Washington Examiner, Detroit News, Sacramento Bee, Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, Indianapolis Star, Wall Street Journal Europe, Jerusalem Post, Financial Times Deutschland, National Post, and the online editions of the American Interest, Weekly Standard and National Review.

Dowd is a contributing editor with the journal Providence; serves as a contributing editor and columnist with the American Legion Magazine, where he writes the Landing Zone column; and has served as an adjunct professor at Butler University and Anderson University, designing and teaching upper-level courses on American foreign policy. Dowd also holds senior fellow posts with the Fraser Institute and the American Security Council Foundation. A founding member of Sagamore’s leadership team, Dowd shouldered a number of day-to-day management and research roles during Sagamore’s early years, before focusing his professional energies on his own writing in 2007. Dowd has been a guest on Fox News Channel’s “Fox and Friends” and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s “Counterpoint.” In addition, he has been interviewed by The Washington Times, The Financial Post (Canada), The National Post (Canada), CBN, CFAX Radio (Vancouver), Cox News Service, WISH-TV (CBS affiliate, Indianapolis), WXIN-TV (Fox affiliate, Indianapolis), KPLS Radio (Los Angeles), WTIC Radio (Connecticut) and WIBC Radio (Indianapolis).

#### Take a look at some of Dowd’s other writing on “byFaithonline” including titles such as “Christians In Camouflage”

<https://byfaithonline.com/?s=alan+dowd>

#### Readiness increases war---interest asymmetry and blowback aggression.

Green 20, Assistant professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati (Brendan, “Security Threats in Contemporary World Politics: Potential Hegemons, Partnerships, and Primacy,” Chapter in A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security, *CATO Institute*, published online May 6th, 2020 at: <https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/security-threats-contemporary-world-politics-potential-hegemons>, Accessed 12-23-2021)

Primacy’s core difficulty is that if highly motivated revisionist states exist, they will be incredibly difficult to manage even with the presence of the American pacifier. Such states are least likely to credit American threats and promises, and they are most likely to accept the costs of American punishment. Primacy has a Goldilocks problem: conditions can be neither too hot nor too cold. Challengers to the American order must be so strongly motivated that they are willing to pay the very considerable costs associated with modern conflict, but not so strongly motivated that the prospect of fighting the United States fails to deter them. Perhaps that describes the world in which we live, but it seems far more likely that only a few states are motivated by an amount of revisionism that is “just right.”

Primacy depends on allies and adversaries alike being responsive to American security guarantees. The more states prefer other objectives to security, the less likely American security blandishments are to influence their behavior. Revisionist opponents will have good reason to believe they have a stronger will than the United States on critical non‐​security issues, and challenges are likely. The simple fact that such states will care far more about the issue in dispute will, thus, incentivize a gamble that the United States will decline to intervene. Even if the United States chooses to fight and even if the United States can deny the challenger its military objectives, revisionists motivated by non‐​security aims will have good reason to believe they can win the resulting contest in pain. How long will Washington continue to bear costs over a quarrel in a faraway country between people about whom it knows nothing?

If the revisionists are allies of the United States, they may simply value the issue at hand more than they value security guarantees. Alternatively, they could make the opposite bet, gambling that the United States can be convinced to support their objectives, however grudgingly, or that less resolved regional actors will be deterred by that possibility. In any case, a basic point holds. Revisionists must take risks to obtain their objectives. A state that places a very high value on non‐​security gains is much more likely to take risks. It is difficult to imagine the Goldilocks revisionists for whom U.S. commitments represent the decisive factor in their calculus.

Those dangers are particularly evident when states seek positional goods, such as status or prestige, that tend to be zero‐​sum. For instance, Wohlforth argues that status is connected to material capabilities and that “dissatisfaction [with status] arises not from dominance itself, but from dominance that appears to rest on ambiguous foundations.”28 Multipolar environments, he argues, cause status dissatisfaction because there are multiple indexes of capability (e.g., military, naval, economic) across which states compare themselves, all of which provide different assessments of status. An illustrative example is the Crimean War, where Russia pursued status goals against an overwhelming coalition whose members themselves had no security concerns. Wohlforth argues that Russia’s power on land and its ambiguity about Britain’s economic power led Russia to pursue a higher rank than it could secure with its capabilities.

Applying those arguments to East Asia should give us pause. Though Wohlforth argues that unipolarity should produce an unambiguous status hierarchy, East Asia looks similar to the Crimean example. Using Wohlforth’s metrics, China has the largest ground force in the world and the ability to rapidly augment it. That point of comparison could be relevant for potential flash points such as the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese navy is no match for its American counterpart in the open ocean, but it is growing and modernizing and would likely be operating close to its own coasts in a potential clash. Economic measures throw the problem into bold relief. Using an index of energy consumption and iron and steel production, Britain was 13.5 times more powerful than Russia at the time of the Crimean War. China’s GDP is roughly half of America’s now and is projected to overtake Washington in the next couple of decades.29 Tsarist Russia had not undergone the Industrial Revolution and misunderstood its economic implications. By contrast, Chinese growth is well understood and is the most salient feature of contemporary East Asian politics. There seems ample cause for the Chinese to experience status dissatisfaction across a number of metrics, which could be very difficult to manage through American commitments in the region.

Offensive realist revisionists pose a similar problem. Offensive realism predicts a bleak world of relentless security competition because of its focus on uncertainty. States cannot reliably predict one another’s intentions—a very difficult task in the present, and an impossible one any distance into the future. “In a world where great powers have the capability to attack one another and might have the motive to do so,” John Mearsheimer argues, states “must at least be suspicious of other states and reluctant to trust them.” The result is that “each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own survival.” The only reliable provision for security is more power.30 Unfortunately, that conclusion means that “alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience: today’s alliance partner might be tomorrow’s enemy,” and vice versa. Offensive realist predictions are, therefore, trouble for primacy. Friends and foes will be looking to take advantage of one another, and they will not be prone to regarding the commitments the United States made a long time ago as especially relevant to the present. Indeed, “great powers are also sometimes unsure about the resolve of opposing states as well as allies.” That uncertainty leads to calculated risks by aggressors and allies who begin to take security measures as though the United States may not intervene. Furthermore, because “fighting wars is a complicated business in which it is often difficult to predict outcomes,” revisionists of all stripes have incentives toward innovation and clever strategies. Fait accompli tactics that quickly revise the status quo and then dare others to push for reversal, or new military technology and doctrines that give revisionists hopes of a quick victory, are likely to be common in an offensive realist world. American commitments will be of questionable value for deterrence or reassurance under those circumstances.31

Nuno Monteiro has recently laid out the problematic relationship between offensive realist assumptions and American strategy. He argues that primacy—which he calls a strategy of “defensive dominance”— tends to create extremely dedicated minor power revisionists, for two reasons. First, primacy is a strategy of locking in the status quo through formal or informal commitments to regional actors. A favorable status quo for major regional powers will often come at the expense of local minor powers, which may be inclined to try to reverse it: for both security reasons and the non‐​security reasons noted earlier, a unipolar world will reduce the “value of peace” for some countries.

Second, the most prominent aspects of the status quo being locked in are the extant territorial, alignment, and power distribution conditions. Those conditions pose no special problems for a state that can ensure its own survival, but minor powers by definition cannot. They exist in a state of radical uncertainty regarding the intentions of the unipole. Lacking the hope of an external sponsor should the unipole turn on them, recalcitrant minor powers have incentives to build up their military power, pursue nuclear weapons, and change the status quo through salami tactics. Those actions are just the sort of security competition that primacy hopes to prevent, and they are likely to precipitate a clash with the unipole.32

## ADV 3

#### ABR is gradual, slow, and will be addressed---reject scary-sounding headlines

Smith 16, PhD molecular biologist, former R&D director at MicroPhage and SomaLogic. (Drew, 6-14-16, “The Myth Of The Post-Antibiotic Era”, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2016/06/14/the-myth-of-the-post-antibiotic-era/#db027696fa83>)

Right now, drug resistant infections are mainly a threat to those that are already sick and/or in medical facilities. But, if we continue down this path, mundane infections in the otherwise healthy could someday morph into life-threatening ordeals, and simple medical procedures and surgeries may be skipped to avoid risk of infection. However, while this threat is real, it’s important to keep in mind that this is an ongoing, gradual challenge; it’s extremely unlikely that a single event will herald with complete certainty the abrupt end of modern medicine as we know it. In this context, those scary headlines are inappropriate, if not numbing and counterproductive. In May, Ars wrote about some alarmist and inaccurate news stories dealing with a newly identified type of drug resistance—one that makes bacteria resistant to a last-resort antibiotic called colistin and can spread between bacteria easily. The headlines blared that it was the “first” time such a dastardly microbe had seeped into the US—which is not true. And they suggested that it would certainly mark the end of antibiotics—also not true. This week, scientists provided updates on tracking that type of resistance, and of course some alarmist headlines followed. Yet, the new data actually suggests that a tempering of concerns about this particular resistance may be in order. It turns out that this “dreaded,” “scary,” “nightmare” of a drug-resistant microbe has been in the US for more than a year and elsewhere in the world since as far back as 2005—it’s just that nobody noticed it. And nobody noticed it because so far it hasn’t been the dreaded, scary nightmare some have feared. “It’s not a huge cause for concern,” Mariana Castanheira, lead author of one of this week’s resistance updates, told Ars. Castanheira is the director for Molecular and Microbiology at JMI Laboratories, a private company that monitors drug resistance microbes in hospitals and medical settings. They and others are finding this new type of resistance now simply because they’re looking for it, she said. Castanheira explains that people initially started digging for this new type of drug resistance—a gene called mcr-1—out of concern that it makes bacteria resistant to the antibiotic colistin, which is a relatively toxic drug used only when nearly all others have failed against a multi-drug resistant infection. Bacteria have shown up with colistin resistance before—in fact, many times in the US and elsewhere around the world. But in those cases, the genes were embedded in the bacteria’s chromosomes and generally passed down through generations. The mcr-1 resistance gene, on the other hand, seems to always sit on a plasmid, a small loop of DNA that bacteria can readily pass around to neighbors. If colistin-resistant bacteria shared their mcr-1 plasmid with others that are already resistant to lots of antibiotics, they could create a long-feared invincible germ—a “pan-resistant” bacteria. “Doesn’t scare me” So far that doesn’t seem to be happening, though, Castanheira said. In more than a decade of skulking around, mcr-1 has made its way into bacteria in animals, people, and soil all over the world. Yet, all of the mcr-1 carrying microbes examined have been susceptible to at least one antibiotic—and often several.